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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since World War Two, there has been a consistent effort
on the part of Western Europe to move towards Integration.
The idea, although not new, has for the first time found a
widespread enthusiasm among the nations within this sector
of Europe. These nations, prodded by the two catastrophic
experiences of World War One and Two^ have sought ways of
overcoming the intense nationalism of the European States.
Their aim Is to emphasize the commonality of these states
which enables them to take advantage of supra-national in-
stitutions and policies.
While the goal of political integration has received
overwhelming support, the issue of what methods to use in
pursuit of that goal has caused widespread disagreement. In
other words, the question of ”How do we get there?” has been
more difficult to resolve than the question of ’’Where do
we want to go?” Basically, the debate has centered around
those wTho argue for a ’’quick” solution (establishment of a
supra-national institution with political and economic powers
--meaning the subjugation of individual member-states* sover-
eignty to it) and those who advocate a ’’slow evolvement” of
political integration. (A slow and careful step-by-step
process starting with economic cooperation between states
2which finally evolves Into the final political goal.)
No matter what the method of European Integration, the
very existence of the concept poses very serious problems
for those European nations who have committed themselves to
the laws and policies of neutrality. In this thesis, our
discussion will center around the problems faced by four of
these neutrals, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.
We will be concerned with first the problems of these four
nations and neutrality In general and then with the more
specific Issue of European Integration.
The study is divided into three parts. The first part
Is concerned with the concept of neutrality. We will be
tracing the development of neutrality as an International
concept In practice as well as in law. From there, we will
note the changes In neutrality that have come as a result of
the cold war. At this point, we will explain the significant
differences between neutrality and neutralism or non-alliance.
The second part is a discussion and development of the
Individual policies of neutrality practised by the four States.
From this discussion, it is hoped to explain why each of these
four States took up the practice of neutrality in the first
place, and why, In the face of the cold war, did they choose
to remain neutral. The primary objective of this part is,
however, to illustrate that each of these four States practices
3a policy of neutrality relative to Its own Individual circum-
stance and political environment.
Finally, Part III Is concerned with the four neutrals
and their position vls-a-vls the Integration of Europe. The
purpose of this discussion Is to explore under what circum-
stances these four nations are willing to take part In the
Integration movement. The four States of .Austria, Finland,
Sweden and Switzerland were chosen specifically for this study
for several reasons. First, they are all neutral In the cold
war. Secondly, they are all of a Western orientation. Lastly,
and most Important to the discussion, they have all at some
point been faced with the dilemma of accepting or rejecting
membership In an European regional organization. The circum-
stances surrounding their participation In these organizations
and Its Impact on their neutrality will hopefully Illuminate
the differences In the neutrality of these four nations. They
should also give us some hint as to the difficulties faced by
the neutrals, as Europe moves toward political and economic
unity.
PART I
NEUTRALITY AND NEUTRALISM
CHAPTER II
NEUTRALITY
Definite on of Neutrality
. The concept of neutrality,
like most concepts, has been defined and redefined by so
many authorities that to find one definition suitable to all
is practically impossible, it is more difficult in the case
of neutrality because as the concept has developed over the
centuries, its meaning has changed. Despite this difficulty,
there are several common features included in most definitions
of neutrality which can serve for definitional purposes with-
out becoming Involved in the intricacies of conceptual con-
struction.
It is generally agreed that neutrality means "keeping
out of war.' 1 Ernest Nys finds the term used in this sense of
non-participation in war as early as 1378. This central theme
is to be found in most of the writers on neutrality regardless
of when they wrote. Examples, of definitions of this sort
include
:
...in general the obligation of neutrality
consists In abstention from hostile acts toward
either belligerent
-Johann W. Textor-
Neutrality, in popular thought, means keeping
out of war. It is the condition of those yho
remain at peace while others are fighting.
^
-Philip Jessup-
6In a more modern sense, neutrality Is a legal status
Involving certain rights and duties. It may describe the
condition of non-participants In a war, or It may connote
the policy of keeping out of war. In both aspects, it
assumes that war Is In existence. L. Oppenhelm explains
the concept is this modern sense. He defines neutrality as:
The attitude of impartiality adopted by
third states towards belligerents and
recognized by belligerents, such attitudes
creating rights and duties between the im-
partial state and the belligerents."
This definition presupposes that a third State at its own
option or volition can decide to adopt an attitude of imparti-
ality at the outbreak of war. This has, in fact, over time
become a well -accepted practice.
The one feature common in all these definitions is that
they all recognize the existence of war. It is the definitions
embracing this condition which have persisted throughout time.
Neutrality is an attitude during a state of
war only . 4
-L. Oppenhelm-
Neutrallty. .. .assumes that war is in existence."
-Philip Jessup-
Given a hot war, every state that stays out
of it is * eo Ipso* neutral.
-Peter Lyon-
In order to bring these fragments of numerous definitions
together, this writer has chosen a definition which encompasses
all of these features and is fairly clear in its explanation
of the concept of neutrality.
7Neutrality designates the conditions of
that State which, while war Is being carried
on between two or more other States, remains
outside of the struggle and strives to pre-
serve with each of the belligerents so far
as possible the normal relations which it main-
tained with them before. So defined, neutral-
ity represents a status half-way between war
and peace.
7
-Nicolas Politls-
For the States which find themselves in such a position,
neutrality Implies a combination of rights and duties. The
rights are those of peacetime, only they are more or less
altered by the occurrence of war. The duties also arise as
a result of the fact of war.
Neutral nations then are those who, during a war, "take
no ones part, remaining friends common to both parties and
not favoring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of
o
the other.
°
Thus defined, let us now turn to a discussion of the
development of neutrality throughout history.
History of Neutral It;/ . Neutrality Is probably as old as
war Itself. There have always been some States which would
take no part in the quarrels of others. In fact, traces of
what was to be called during the past three centuries the
"law of neutrality" can be occasionally found In ancient
history, for Instance In Greece and India. In other ancient
times, there was no place for neutrality. Such was the case
during the rule of Rome where during a war third States had
8to declare themselves for or against Rome. One was either
an ally or an enemy. (The Elsenhower-Dulles policy of the
1950's on non-alignment was very similar. However, Dulles found
neutrality repugnant on moral grounds, while It was a means
of protection for States during the Roman Rule.)
During the Middle Ages, the situation was basically the same
as a result of several factors retarding the development of
neutrality. The first of these factors was the Influence of
feudalism. Because of feudal obligations of the princes, they
were not free to choose between belligerency and neutrality.
The most that a vassal could do was to resist the power of his
overlord which, in many cases, just substituted a conflict with
his Lord for a conflict with his Lord's enemy. A second and
more important factor retarding the development of the concept
of neutrality was the overwhelming power and Influence of the
Church. In its temporal aspects, the Church was a part of the
feudal system; thus, the above remarks apply to it. As a
spiritual power, the Church strove at times to unite its
faithful against the enemies of the Church. "One could not
be neutral in a conflict between God and the foes of God.”?
All Christian countries were summoned to fight the common
enemy. War between two States was considered In principle as
a matter of general concern. ”No member of the Empire could
be disinterested In a conflict which disturbed the harmony of
9the community; no Christian could be Indifferent to the
struggles of the Church, or remain neutral in the wars of
Christianity against the infidels, or in those of orthodory
against heresy .” 10
A third retarding feature of the Middle Ages was the
distinction between a ’’just” war and an ’’unjust” war. Here
again, the spiritual influence of the Church was apparent.
The attempt to make this distinction was originally due to
the necessity of reconciling the pacifism of the Church with
support for the Emperor* s wars. It became more or less
agreed that everybody should support a ’’just” war, and no-
body an ’’unjust” one: ’’The problem of ’neutrality* came to
be considered from the point of view of whether a war was
*Just* or ’unjust,’ and neutral duties toward a nation waging
a ’just’ war were measured differently from those which
existed towards a nation embarking on an ’unjust* war.” i:
Neutrality as an institution of reciprocal rights and
duties between belligerents and non-belligerents has a com-
paratively recent origin. It is mainly the result of poli-
tical and economic relations between nations in the last
three centuries. It is here that the history of neutrality
reveals the mutual Influence of and close connection among:
(a) the status of national sovereignty,, (b) the status of
war and (c) the status of neutrality.
10
The emergence of the nation-state means the recognition
of national sovereignty as supreme and, consequently, the right
of a nation to go to war. "If sovereign States enjoy equal
status in law, the circumstances In which two States go to
war can be no concern of other equally sovereign States who
wish to remain outside such war. Cnee one regards war as a
necessary condition of international life, and grants it a
status of legitimacy, one must also recognize the status of
neutrality." It became necessary for the belligerents to
observe the principles of neutrality in order that the number
of their enemies was not increased, and the theatre of war
was localized. "The belligerent soon found that his hands
were not free. The annoyance of the enemy might be relished,
but that of third parties might lead to hostile alliances."^
The neutral looked for protection, especially those with
large merchant marines. The first agreements between belli-
gerents and neutrals were made concerning the rights of
>
neutrals to trade during war. A study of treaties, state
papers and Juristic writings from the fifteenth century
through the eighteenth century leads to the conclusion that
this is the way in which the law of neutrality developed.
The treaties concerning trade and sea commerce between belli-
gerent and neutral became accepted practice in time of war
and were greatly expanded to include other rights and duties
of both neutrals and belligerents. The most important duties
11
of the neutrals which developed over this time were abstention
from and Impartiality In war. The most sacred right, of course
being the right to neutrality.
-As is so often the case, the discrepancy between the
theory of law and the practice of law concerning neutrality
and neutrals 1 rights was very great. Laws governing the rights
of neutrals and belligerents were like all laws, determined
by those who had the power to enforce them. In the nineteenth
century while the concept of neutrality was developing rapidly
In the legal sense, in actual practice, it was under great
strain from those who held the power Internationally. Although
numerous treaties were made concerning trade and commerce rights
of neutrals on the sea, Britain found it convenient most of the
time to break those treaties. This was especially true when
she confronted agreements made between France and a neutral
concerning war supplies. Britain was involved In a life and
death struggle with France, and since she held sway over the
seas, she had no reservations about violating neutral-belli-
gerents rights in respect to Interfering with sea commerce.
She simply had the power to withstand any sanctions which might
be placed against her. And It was Napoleon who declared
that ’’there are no neutrals,’’ as he swept across the continent
of Europe. Ke, too, had the power to deny any rights or duties
afforded to neutrals and belligerents. Thus, ’’...the general
attitude towards neutrality is determined by the comparative
12
strength or weakness of the International order at any parti-
cular point of time." 1 ** It was and is subject to the rather
whimsical nature of governments, especially those who hold
sway over international politics. Even though by the start
of the twentieth century the laws of neutrality and neutral
rights and duties were for the most part coded into inter-
national law, the actual obedience to those codes was at
times rather insignificant.*
The period after World War One saw many authorities
predicting the death of neutrality. Because of the devast-
ating effect of the war on mankind, the creation of the League
of Nations, and the attempt to outlaw war, it was thought
that the status of neutrality would be abolished. In fact,
the view was prevalent that a neutral shirks his share^of the
burden of humanity. Neutrality became very unpopular in those
years. However, as the failures of the League of Nations
became apparent, and the attempt to outlaw war proved futile,
neutrality took on new meaning as a desirable status in the
face of war. As war approached in Europe in the late 1930* s,
the scramble for neutrality in the struggle was common.
*This was especially true during World War One. Before
the war, agreement had been reached on rules governing neutrals'1
rights at sea. These were coded in the Declaration of London.
During the war, little, if any, actual obedience to this
Declaration was apparent. Neutral rights in commercial matters
were pretty much violated by the belligerents also. In total,
neutrality was thought of negatively during World War One.
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MeutrMi t.y and Tuternat-i ona] law . From Its beginning,
the codification of International law on neutrality has had
a profound effect on the nature of the concept. Probably
the most significant codification was the Initial one result-
ing In the Console to del Mare; the establishment of rules
regulating wartime non-belllgerents and their rights at sea.
This was the first time that what had become common practice
at sea was set down In writing as law. Up to that point,
there had existed only Individual treaty arrangements between
two nations concerning neutral and belligerent relations.
From this point on, the codification of laws of neutrality
at different points in time signified a general awareness and
acceptance by most nations of the development of neutrality
laws
.
The Importance of neutrality as an Institution of Inter-
national law did not come about until the nineteenth century
.
During this century, the development of International rules
of neutrality was due to three factors.. The most prominent
and Influential factor was the attitude of the United States
of America towards neutrality. The strict adherence of the
United States to the codes of neutrality and the establish-
ment of new codes preventing American citizens from talcing
part In foreign quarrels laid the groundwork for the Erltlsh
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818.
Also of great importance to international laws of
neutrality was the neutralization of Switzerland in 1815
and Belgium in 1831. The significance of these events was
the establishment of a new concept in international law;
permanent neutrality to be acquiesced to by belligerents
in all wars. The third factor was the Declaration of Paris
of I856 which incorporated into International Law the rule
that neutral goods on enemy ships must not be seized, and
that blockades must be effective.
The continuance of the codification of laws of neutral-
ity occurred up until the outbreak of World War One. Most
important of these was the Hague Convention of 1907 which
concerned Itself with the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
on Sea and on Land. However, the failure to achieve British
ratification of these conventions meant, in actuality, the
non-adherence to them by anyone when war actually broke out.
This proved to be the case in the First World War.
The post-war period brought about radical changes in
neutrality in International Law. Many thought that the es-
tablishment of the League of Nations and its collective
security system of keeping peace would make neutrality obsolete.
In a system where all members were by agreement responsible
for the actions of one, there was presumably no room for
abstention from collective action through neutrality. It is
true that the Covenant of the League of Nations as a document
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of international law was a radical alteration of the tradi-
tional concept of neutrality. But it did not abolish it,
and it was incoirect to think so. "The correct view was
probably that while in some cases, namely, when resort to
war was not contrary to the Covenant, the latter had not
altered the law of neutrality. It had, without abolishing
it, vitally affected it in those cases in which members of
the League were bound or authorized to apply sanctions
under Article 16."^ The Importance of the Covenant on
neutrality was that the Covenant-breaking belligerent was
deemed, by signing the Covenant in advance, to measures of
discrimination being applied against him by those members of
the League who did not elect to declare war upon him .
The second attempt of the post-war period to radically
change the concept of neutrality came in the ratification in
1928 of the Pact of Paris, or the "General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War." Since the Treaty has no provisions for
the enforcement of its obligation to outlaw war, it does not
affect the law of neutrality directly. In other words, given
the outbreak of war in violation of the Treaty, the tradi-
tional laws of neutrality would still apply. However, there
is little doubt that by destroying the absolute sovereign
right of States to go to war "...the Treaty has provided a
starting-point for important changes in the law of neutrality."
1 ^
16
For, as a rule, " ...the outbreak of war will be due to a
violation of the Treaty on the part of at least one belli-
gerent., The guilty belligerent, by breaking the Treaty,
violates the rights of signatories...” 1 ?
World War Two brought about the modification of
neutrality. This was a result mainly of the United States’
willingness to change her status of neutrality a little at
a time. Her Increased support of the Allied nations was
done not as a violation of her neutrality but as a policy
of self-defense. In fact, in the last stages of her neutrality
before entering the war, neutrality had come to mean that
sanctions against the aggressor nations were within the scope
of the concept, because war had been outlawed as a legal
Instrument of national policy.
Cut of these modifications came the concept of non-
belligerency. This term applies to those States who are not
actively participating In the war, but who, for one reason
or another, are aiding In the war effort through material
and Ideological support. Such was the position of Sweden
during World War Two.
The ratification of the United Nations Charter by a
number of States after World War Two signified yet another
change in the law of neutrality. It is In many ways like
the Covenant of the League of Nations in that it also limits
17
the right of a State to be neutral, yet does not abolish
neutrality altogether. In principle, no member of the United
Rations is entitled to remain neutral in a war ’n which the
Security Council has found a particular State guilty of a
breach of peace or act of aggression. Members lose all rights
to neutrality only under Article k2, which insists that
members declare war or take sanctions which are Intended as
war. Here again under Collective Security, the right to remain
neutral has been given up for the sake of the Community.
Whether this new change from the traditional rights and duties
of neutrality will prevail in time of war is yet to be determined.
The post-war era beginning in 19^6 has seen many changes
in the concept of neutrality. With the beginning of a new and
different type of war, the cold war, has come the emergence of
a new concept, that of neutralism and non-alignment. That this
new concept has roots in the traditions of neutrality is a
foregone conclusion. But because the cold war is radically
different from the traditional ”hot war,” new definitions and
laws must be used to understand the concept of neutralism. It
is to this subject that we now turn.
CHAPTER III
THE COLD WAR AND NEUTRALISM
The Cold War. The years following the conclusion of the
Second World War were years of change on the International
scene. First, came the creation of the United Nations and
Its collective security system. Secondly, there was the
emergence of many new nations In the old colonial areas of
Asia and Africa, who because of their newly acquired independ-
ence brought a certain amount of hope and goodwill to a world
weary of war. However, the most important changes for the
world came as a result of the war itself. The most significant
of these was the Introduction of the atomic bomb by the United
States. The bombing of Japan signaled the start of the Nuclear
Age and all its ramifications for mankind. The end of the war
also found the two super-powers of the world about to embark
upon a new concept of war, one that would cause a redefinition
of many traditional relationships and concepts, both legally
and politically. This new concept of war which has since been
entitled the "cold war" has had a significant effect upon the
traditions of neutrality, primarily because of the previous
direct relationship that existed between neutrality and the
"hot war" or "shooting war." However, before discussing these
changes, let us examine briefly the conditions which led the
world into the era of the cold war.
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The end of the war left the United States and the Soviet
Union as the Inheritors of International power. Besides being
the sole possessor of the atomic weapon, the United States
had forces deployed from Southeast Asia to Central Europe.
Russia, on the other hand had amassed the largest land array
known to man In Eastern Europe and was probing and pushing
Into Central and Southern Europe. Although they had been
allies against the Germans, these two global powers were split
by many pre-existing antagonisms, some dating back as far as
1917. Outstanding among these were the fundamental Ideolo-
gical differences between Communism and Democracy. Moreover,
during the war, each had, at one time or another, accused the
other of falling to carry his share of the war effort, thus
Increasing the distrust and antagonism between the two nations.
By the end of the war, these two troublesome, monolithic giants
were squared off against each other In Central Europe, each
with enough grievances against the other to start another war
and be able to justify Its actions. However, due to the weari-
ness of war on both sides and skillful diplomacy at the allied
conferences, actual war was avoided. Instead, each side
launched a war of propaganda and diplomatic maneuvers In the
attempt to extract certain concessions from the other side.
Finally, In 19^7, as a result of the Russian attempts In Eastern
Europe to solidify Its hold over those countries, both militarily
20
and politically, the United States announced the beginning
of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, both of which
were designed to keep Communism from spreading Into the
United States* spheres of influence. It is at this point
that most historians mark the beginning of the cold war. It
Is also here that the need for defining and redefining new
and old conceptions of war becomes apparent.
Redefinition of the Concept of ’’War .”
We live today in a state of cold war, that
Is armed fear. It is not peace that we are
having but a precarious equilibrium In which
dissension does not declare Itself because of
mutual fear, It is not a state of order; there
is no inward tranquilityA
-Dr. S. Radhakrl shnan-
The above statement relates to the situation after 19^7,
Both Russia and the United States scrambled to bolster their
causes by soliciting support from nations around the world.
t
They each promised economic and military aid to those nations
who would join them In an alliance against the other. This
bi-polar power struggle has evolved into an ideological struggle
between the Bast and the West, Communism versus Democracy and
Left versus Right. Each has developed its instruments of
’’cold war” just as they had in the ’’shooting war.” Instruments
such as propaganda, fear and distrust, threats of nuclear
annihilation, localized wars of intervention, economic and
military bribes and any other means short of actual ’’hot war”
21
are used. For cold war Is Institutionally psychological
warfare, the aim of which Is to nourish an idea of war In
the minds of men. The strategy is to enable the victor to
overpower a rival psychologically by the threat of ones
armed strength with a view to winning a political or diplo-
matic victory. It is neither war nor peace In the traditional
sense as defined by International Law. Traditionally, "War
Is a contention between two or more States through their
armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and
Imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases."''
Peace has been defined as the end of a shooting war, commencing
with the signing of a peace treaty. On the other hand, cold
war is defined as:
....originating from mutual suspicion and
mistrust, (cold war) Is the contention in
peace-time between two or more States or
between rival Power blocs, conducted by a
show of strength and by diverse means short
of armed intervention, for the purpose of
psychologically overpowering each other and
b>r an extension of the respective political
spheres of influence, involving in its process
breaches of the principles of peaceful co-
existence recognized by the United Nations
Charte^, thereby endangering the climate of
peace
.
-Roy Chowdhury-
From the distinction made above between "hot war" and
the new concept, cold war, one can envisage the effect upon
traditional neutrality that such a change has. Neutrality
under International Law was only applicable during an actual
22
shooting war . Except for those States who were under perma-
nent neutrality (neutralized), the cold war meant for many
a drastic change In their foreign policy. Many sought to
align themselves with one side or the other for protection
and. also to forestall aggression If and when a shooting war
started. This was especially true of the small European
nations such as Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark who,
though they were traditionally neutral, had had a negative
experience with neutrality during the Nazi period and now
sought alliance with the West. However, other States,
among them many newly created States who were groping to
maintain their newly acquired independence, found It expedi-
ent to align themselves with neither side.. Thus, the con-
cept of non-alignment or neutralism was born as a counter
position to the cold war. The new neutralist stance vis-a-
vis the cold war signaled a radical departure from the tra-
ditions of neutrality. Let us now examine this change.
Neutralism . As was discussed In Chapter II, neutrality
Implied that a country had been reduced merely to the role of
a spectator In global affairs, that it was Isolated from the
events taking place In the rest of the world and that its
policies were based upon indifference to global Issues.
Neutralism, on the other hand, is described and connoted by
words such as ’’positive 11 and ’’dynamic" to emphasize that it
23
ts not Isolation, and that it is active, not passive; that
it is a position and policy of responsibility. Tt does not
require a nation to steer a middle course between East and
West. Neutralist nations do not accept the obligation of
equidistance as pertains to neutrality. Neutralism implies
diplomatic freedom of action and choice with respect to the
cold war. "Non-alignment is not to be identified with
isolationism, nor is it to be confused with any hypothetical
necessity of equal cooperation with the two blocs.
The customary language of a cold war neutralist reflects
the difference in emphasis from the traditional neutral in
time of war. The neutral will tend to stress that there is
a legal right of States to be neutral under International Law.
The neutralist tends rather to stress that it is morally
right for any State to be neutralist, and that "world opinion"
endorses the rightness of neutralist policies. Where the
neutral tends to talk more of law than morality, the neutralist
stresses morality over law.
All neutralists begin by rejecting emphatically the notion
that they should view the world from within the confines of a
cold war alliance, "....the simple truth is that the neutralists
are no more pro-Russian than pro-American. They are pro-peace.
They are convinced that the cold war, if it lasts long enough
must inevitably erupt into a hot one. "-5 In general, it may be
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said that, above all, neutralism implies diplomatic freedom
of action or choice with respect to cold war contestants.
"To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim their
Independence, neutrality is not a declaration in advance of
a fixed position to be taken in case of war, or a claim to
rights against belligerent encroachment. It is a political
expedient. It is not passive but active. It asserts that
each State is determined to go its own Independent way in
accordance with its own current estimate of its own interests,
and it expresses the hope of getting along with both sides
and doing business with both sides and perhaps of influencing
both sides and even of serving as a bridge to bring them
closer together."^
No neutralist claims that his cold war neutralism necess-
arily means that his own country would not become Involved
in a general "hot war." The present defense of neutralism
is, substantially, that it can help prevent war. By playing
either a "third force" role in the bi -polar world or by acting
as a peacemaking intermediary, neutralist nations hope to
loosen the rigid alliance structures and relieve the tensions
of the cold war. It is with this purpose in mind that neu-
tralist nations actively take part in global politics, reject-
ing the Isolation and impartiality of traditional neutrality
which they feel became outdated with the coming of the Nuclear
A ge
.
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There are other differences between the concepts of
neutrality and neutralism, but they arise mostly as a
result of the Individual State's specific situation rela-
tive to its own interests. This situation gives rise to
the practising of many different types of neutralism.
There are, however, essentially six types of neutralist
policy which may be usefully distinguished. A neutralist
policy may be practised by: (1) a neutralized State (Austria,
Laos), (2) a traditional neutral (Sweden, Switzerland),
(3) a buffer or former buffer (Finland, Afghanistan), (4)
an erstwhile isolationist (Ireland, Saudia Arabia)
, (5) a
pioneer neutralist (India, Yugoslavia), and (6) a new State
neutral (Eygpt, Iraq, Nigeria). It may seem to be contra-
dictory to place traditional neutrals and neutralized States
under the broad category of neutralism, yet, given the
Nuclear Age and all its ramifications for war and the emer-
gence of the concept of psychological warfare embodied in
the cold war, one can no longer follow the guidelines which
existed previously. The norms of tradtional war and neu-
trality no longer exist, and even those States who have
traditions of neutrality or neutralization have had to adjust
their positions and policies to the given circumstances. This
they have done and, therefore, they each practise, to some
degree, policies consistent with neutralism.
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Of the six types listed above, three of them pertain to
the four European nations considered In this study. Austria
Is a State which was neutralized, by treaty agreement In 1955.
Sweden and Switzerland can be considered traditional neutrals
since they have both held to the status of neutrality during
the "hot wars" of the twentieth century. Finally, because of
her geographic position, next to the Soviet Union, Finland
Is considered a buffer State. (Although not In the same
sense as the Eastern European biiffer States, because she has
been able to thwart Soviet attempts to undermine her demo-
cratic Institutions and, thus, keep relatively free of
Soviet Influence domestically.)
Fart II of this study will be concerned with exploring
the particular policies of neutralism as practised by these
four nations. Cur concentration will be focused on the
specific reasons for such a policy and the guidelines which
they have established for their neutralism.
PART II
FOUR EUROPEAN NEUTRALS:
SWEDEN, FINLAND, SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA
CRAFTER IV
SWEDEN AND NEUTRALITY
History . The beginnings of Swedish neutrality date bacl<
over one hundred and fifty years to the end of the Napoleonic
wars. Since 1814, Sweden has not participated In any war or
joined any alliance. Over this period, she had developed a
tradition of peace and neutrality. It Is a feat which Is little
understood by most and has been described by historians as
”an astounding and all but unaccountable phenomenon.”-1- Others,
In explaining this long period of Swedish neutrality, suggest
that the ”... reasons for this long period of peace are no
doubt to be found In the geographic position of the country,
In special circumstances such as the dependence of certain
belligerents on Swedish Iron ore and In pure luck.” : To be
sure, the shrewdness of Swedish leaders and diplomats is
largely responsible for Sweden* s long tradition of neutrality
In the past century and a half which saw the world engulfed
In two catastrophic world wars and numerous other regional
wars of international consequences. The amazing fact Is that,
despite the constant challenges provided by those conflicts
to Sweden’s neutrality, she was able to walk the tight rope
between alliances in peace and belligerents in war, achieving
her position as a traditional non-aligned State without
suffering damage to the process of neutralization.
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Swedish foreign policy, during the nineteenth century,
was one of a small and weak State. It could hardly be
called a policy of deliberate
»' neutrality. 1 ' By this time,
Sweden had become reconciled to its new situation as a minor
European power. She was also located on the periphery of
the Immediate zone of interest of the great powers. These
circumstances permitted her to reorient her foreign policy
as changes in the balance of power warranted. Yet, Sweden
demonstrated at different times definite positions of parti-
ality which contradict the status of neutrality in its strict-
est sense. This was especially apparent in her actions
against Russia during the Crimean War. However, despite these
brief periods of partiality, Sweden managed to develop a
tradition of neutrality in war and non-alignment in peace.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the rise of
German power and its subsequent influence internationally had
created a balance of power in the Baltic region between
Germany and Russia. This balance contributed to the security
of the small north European States, allowing them to remain
neutral during World War One. Despite intense hostility to
Russia and strong tendencies toward alliance with Germany by
her governing and military classes, Sweden declared her
neutrality on August 4, 1914 Henceforth, she consistently
espoused a neutral policy.
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The Swedish Inter-war policy was conditioned by the
new International and strategic conditions In northern Europe.
Because both Germany and Russia were greatly weakened b\ the
war, the Swedes decided to disarm and reduce the strength
of Its defenses which had been kept at a high level during
the war. Behind this decision were both an accurate appraisal
of the strategic situation and also an over-optimistic assump-
tion of a lasting state of peace. Such optimism necessarily
came from Sweden’s participation in the international organ-
ization dedicated to peace. Sweden was one of thirteen neutral
States of the First World War which became original members of
the League of Nations.
Her entry into the League was a form of deviation from
the deliberate policy of neutrality that she had held to during
the twentieth century and had reinforced strongly throughout
World War One.* However, the Swedish experience with the
League demonstrated that she was anxious to maintain her
traditional foreign policy in spite of her membership in the
League. "The Swedish attitude had been revealed already by
its negative view of military sanctions when entering the
League. It was also manifested in the Swedish support for
efforts to accept new members in the organization. Sweden
*After World War One, Swedish politics were dominated by
the parties of the Left, the Social Democrats and the Liberals.
For these parties, it was a matter of course that Sweden
should <}oin the new peace organization.
cM d not want to be Identified, because of its membership
In the League, with any particular set of powers. .. .The
fundamental interest of Sweden was marked by its consistent
efforts to support principles of international law when
confllc-ts were referred to the new peace organization.”^
By the early 1930* s, the League* s Inability to cope
with outbreaks of hostility was apparent. The Italian
conquest of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War brought the
reality of failure to the members of the League. In 1936,
Sweden, along with several other nations, renounced her
obligation to the Covenant. Besides returning to her former
policy of neutrality, Sweden halted her disarmament program
and once again began her program of defense to protect her
neutrality.
At the outbreak of World War Two in September, 1939,
Sweden Immediately declared that she would remain neutral.
Throughout the war, she constantly protected and nourished
her neutrality in the face of possible German attack and
despl te accusations by both sides that she had violated that
neutrality. In actuality, Sweden did violate her neutrality
on several occasions during the war. These violations were
•a result of either necessary political concessions (allowing
Germany to transport her troops across Sweden) or humani-
tarian efforts (aiding the Finns materially and diplomatically
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\n their desperate fight against the Russians In the "Winter
War" of 19^0). She also helped train Norwegians and Danes as
part of the underground movement In those countries to rid
them of the Nazi Occupation. By the end of the War, especi-
ally after her Involvement In the Russo-Flnnlsh War, Sweden
no longer had a strict neutral policy. In reality, her posi-
tion was more that of a non-belligerent than that of a neutral.
Swedish Fost-war Neutralism . Since the Second World War,
Sweden has been much worse off strategically than she was
after the First World War. By 19^5. her politico-military
situation had deteriorated considerably. Whereas In 1919 a
balance of power had existed In the Baltic between Russia and
Germany, after 19^5. the entire area was under Soviet control.
The Russians had moved Into parts of southeastern Finland,
had absorbed the three Baltic States and held military control
over the Polish and German Baltic coasts. The Soviet seml-
enclrclement of Sweden was completed with a base at Petsamo
and absorption of the Konlgsberg area.
More Important than this was the shift In the center of
gravity In the International balance of power. The new
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union clearly limited the scope of free action on the part
of a small State and rendered less favorable the prospects
of neutrality. This did not, however, cause the Swedes, on
the whole, to abandon their traditional policy of neutrality.
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There still were compelling reasons for keeping it. One
author argued.
For Sweden, very definite reasons could
be cited for a continuation of the policy
of neutrality. Sweden could best pro-
mote world peace by keeping outside ar
power blocs and great power alliances...
Such a policy would mean a continuation
of the policy of neutrality during World
War II and previously. Sweden had an
exposed position. If It were to become a
member of a great power bloc It would form
a frontier area within this bloc and as
such might be exposed to the first blow in
a conflict.
5
Another author stated,
Abandonment of a policy of neutrality
would certainly transfer the area into a
theatre of war; perhaps even an important
one, whereas neutrality could possibly
^
permit the belligerents to Ignore Sweden. c
By 19*18, the Swedish government had definitely decided
to pursue a policy of non-alignment or neutralism. It rejected
offers to join both the Brussels Pact and NATO,* desiring to
remain free and Independent of any power bloc entanglement.
In some quarters, it was emphasized that ”A characteristic
feature of our 'non-alignment 1 is that we, in case of war, are
not committed to any specific course of action.... It is a vital
Interest to our country that other powers conceive our policy
as .. .directed towards keeping the country outside a great
power war. Official government messages to the Parliament
*The American project to create NATO raised a serious
debate in Sweden. The Swedish army leaders argued that the
military basis of Sweden's traditional policy was now un-
tenable, given the considerable power of the Soviet Union.
The government leaders replied that they must consider po-
litical as well as military aspects of the situation. They
pointed, out that Sweden's neutrality did much to allay Soviet
3b
(Riksdag) confirmed such a course:
The Swedish people, no less now than before,
feel themselves invited to go to a front
which means that we engage ourselves in the
cold war which is on. The fact that Sweden
has been able to preserve her peace for 135
years undoubtedly has a strong psychological
influence on the attitude of the Swedish
public. During this long period Europe has
been shaken by tremendous wars without
Sweden being Involved. Whatever the explan-
ation for our escape may be our people cannot
in any case lightly be convinced that our
security now should force us to cast away
neutrality as an abortive and antiquated
policy .
8
The risk that Sweden will be dragged into the
war in case of an East-West conflict is very
great but there is a probability, albeit a
small one, that we will be able to hold
ourselves outside of the war. As long as
there is the smallest possibility of avoiding
the nation’s destruction, advantage of it must
be taken .
9
The policies that emerged out of the early post-war
years have remained Intact although they have been modified
whenever necessary. Sweden’s policy has remained grounded
upon two main points of view. According to Osten Unden,
M The first mainpoint is that Sweden ought not tie herself
to a....Great Power alliance. The second main point is that
suspicions, and that Soviet hostility would be too high a
price to pay for limited military assistance from RATO.
The government also argued that Soviet reactions to Swedish
membership in NATO most certainly would Include a threat to
the sovereignty and independence of Finland.
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we wish to take part In and to further all fruitful inter-
national cooperation outside the sphere of the military.” 10
She has a policy of neutralism in the simplest sense, that of
non-alignment in the cold war. It is an active policy for
peaceful purposes, working internationally through the United
Nations, and is also a liberal and pragmatic policy of neu-
tralism created as an instrument to promote the interest of
the country. Its main aim of non-alignment in peace is directed
toward preserving neutrality in war. Yet, Swedish neutralism
rejects the idea that non-alignment must be combined with
ideological neutrality. Because of her history as a demo-
cracy and her liberal traditions, she is tied to the West, and
to talk about absolute Swedish neutrality is a bluff which
fools neither side in the cold war. Her historical enemy is
Russia, and the Swedes have reacted aggressively to the Soviet
Union* s activities in eastern Europe. Yet, they also object
to the United States’ presence in Vietnam, in the attempt to
counter communist accusations of "false neutrality.”
^\bove all, Sweden follows a realistic foreign policy
principle of national self-interest. She has not allowed the
implementation of an international organization of collective
security embodied in the United Nations to create false hopes
of a lasting peace, as did the League of Nations. Indeed,
Sweden practices a policy of armed neutrality. Directly after
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the decision was made in 19*49 to reject NATO membership,
Sweden embarked upon an armaments program which was Intended
to achieve a position of strength, one which would deter
aggression. The government itself, in a message to the
Riksdag on February 9, 19*49, admitted that the policy of
non-alllance confronts Swedish defense with great demands.
It has to seek an appropriate balance between the needs of
diplomacy and defense. "In our opinion the policy must aim
at pacifying our territory in such a sense that this terri-
tory is not disposed of by another power for military prep-
are t ions .
By 195*4, her defenses were impressive. She had the
fourth largest air force in the world. She manufactured
her own armaments, making her completely independent from
others for her weapons. Her munition factories were among
the most modern in the world, turning out highly respected
war materials. Also, by 195*4, Sweden could mobilize six
hundred thousand men for her army within the period of a
few days.
,
More recently, she has built underground air raid
shelters. "Operation Granite," a program of blasting out
atomic bomb shelters in solid rock, has provided Sweden
with as complete a civil defense system as is to be found
anywhere. This project also built hardened missile sites
for Sweden 1 s missile forces. Except for fuel, Sweden 1 s
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defense establishment Is completely Independent of any other
nation, a circumstance which Is very compatible with an
Independent foreign policy. She Is prepared to defend her
neutrality by causing those who would violate her status to
pay a high price for their aggression.
Sweden’s non-alignment policies In the cold war do not
deter her from actively participating In causes concerned
with promoting International peace and cooperation. Since
her entry In 19^9 Into the United Nations, Sweden has been
a source of leadership and resources for that organization.
Through the United Nations, Sweden has been able to parti-
cipate actively In International politics and still remain
unattached to any power bloc In the cold war. In this way,
she can pursue her policy of active neutralism while search-
ing for ways to overcome the tensions of the bl -polarization
of power.
Sweden has served the cause of peace through the United
Nations several times in the past twenty years. She sent
medical staffs and supplies into the Korean conflict and peace
keeping forces into the Middle East during the 1956 Sinai
crisis. -Again, during the Belgian Congo Crisis of I960,
Swedish forces were in the United Nations’ contingent. By
1964, over 10,000 Swedes had participated In United Nations*
peace forces, Including tours of duty in Israel, Lebanon,
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Congo, Kashmir and Cyprus. 12 Two prominent Swedes have lost
their lives serving the cause of the United Nations. Count
Folk Eernadotte and Dag Hammarsk jold both died while offi-
cially representing the United Nations In different parts
of the world.
While it was true that the actual joining of the United
Nations represented a second departure from the strict policy
of neutrality pursued by Sweden beforehand,* her consistent
practice of non-involvement in great power disputes within
the organization has allowed her to retain her impartiality
to some degree. It is Sweden* s policy not to participate in
any United Nations* action which does not have the full agree-
ment of all Security Council members. In this way, she does
not become caught between the rival blocs existing in that
organ of the United Nations. It is a policy which expresses
solidarity with the international community in its search for
peace and, at the same time, allows Sweden to follow her
traditional policies of non-alignment and neutrality.
Each Swedish foreign policy decision which has been
made over the past twenty-five years has not been without
opposition in Sweden. .Although she has maintained a tradition
of neutrality, there are forces within the country who feel
*55veden*s League of Nations membership was the first
departure from strict legal neutrality.
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that the rapid change In International politics after the
Second World War dictates that Sweden become aligned to a
power bloc In order to preserve herself In the event of
war. These sentiments have been strongly supported In the
Riksdag, especially during the NATO debate. However, It
Is clear that since the war the policy of non-alllance
has had the support of an overwhelming majority of not only
the parliament but also of the general public. This majority
has embraced many different shades of opinion which can be
classified Into three groups.
The attitude of the first group Is one of pure neutrality.
It has Its foundations In the pacifist position. Its attitude
Is dictated as much by the hatred of war as by the feeling
that Sweden cannot Influence the policies of the great powers.
•’The arguments of this group have gradually become not so much
a plea for that freedom of action which can be ascribed to the
expression * freedom from alliance’ but rather a defense of
neutrality as a goal in itself.” J /mong the supporters of
this policy are farmers and working classes who cling most
reverently to the tradition of neutrality.
The second group puts emphasis on non-alllance In order
to have freedom of action. It characterizes neutrality at
any price as out of date and divorced from real!ty a It has
been its aim to keep Sweden out of great power conflicts as
ko
was demonstrated during the debates over Sweden* s United
Nations* membership and sanctions against China In Korea.
"The position of this second group can be explained for
the most part by a general anti -communist sentiment and
anxiety over Sweden’s greater vulnerability and defense-
lessness In this age of air warfare and atom bombs."-5- 1*
This group gains support from conservatives and liberals
and also from some military circles.
Finally, a third group has emerged recently. This
group, often called "the third force," recommends a purely
neutralist policy. Its position is based partly on criti-
cism of the United States—which has often been Identified
with anti-socialism—and partly as an attempt to distinguish
positive achievements of Communism. It claims that Sweden
ought to strive for a genuinely neutral policy that seeks
to reconcile the two opposing blocs.
In general, Swedes support the policy of neutralism
which has been adopted by their government. They also have
come to support the idea "that the uncommitted, in many
respects privileged position of Sweden also Imposes definite
obligations of serving the cause of International peace.
Consequently, they have demonstrated a remarkable x^illingness
to help insure the neutrality of their country by supporting
the nation’s defense programs and, at the same time, to serve
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the international community through the United Nations.
Summary. The Swedish approach to neutrality in the cold
war has been a pragmatic and liberal one. It Is pragmatic
in the sense that Swedish neutrality serves the best Interests
of that small European State. It adopts policies which expand
her trade, it pursues programs of International cooperation
which result in favorable relations throughout the world and
it serves the interests of the Nordic region by stabilizing,
through Its non-alllance posture, a potentially explosive
area. The Swedish approach to neutrality is liberal in its
application. Sweden does not permit the strict and rigid in-
ternational laws of neutrality to serve her as guidelines for
policy. She follows those policies which are suitable to the
specific conditions of the cold war. And yet, she finds
herself limited by her policy of non-alllance as is evident
when she considers joining organizations of western Europe
which require political or military integration. She can seek
membership only in those organizations such as the European
Free Trade Association and the Organization for Economic and
Cultural Development whose concerns are purely economic.
Sweden also finds herself stifled in many cases by her neighbor,
Finland. Fear of a Soviet invasion of Finland has caused the
Swedes to move cautiously In their relations with the West in
order not to provoke Russian ambitions in Finland.
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The essence of Swedish neutrality rests In the prospects
of remaining out of war. It Is the central concern of all
Swedish officials and citizens. As Tage Erlander states,
"We hope that our neutrality In peacetime will make It possible
for us to be neutral In war. A big nation always knows It
will still be alive after a war. For the small nation like
ourselves, war is the catastrophe that may mean the end. ”16
He also observes that, M For the time being, the Swedish
citizen consoles himself with the thin hope that the next war
might be a short one. If only Sweden could sit out the first
ten days, there might be no more need of joining an alliance. 1 '-1 ?
If Sweden is to realize its goals concerning neutrality, It
must constantly demonstrate to the international community
that Its neutrality Is real, and that It is pursuing a policy
which is credible and practical in the world today. Torsten
Nilsson concludes that,
An essential condition determining whether
a policy of neutrality can be maintained
when put to the test Is of course that the
rest of the world must have confidence in
the will of the neutral state to uphold
unfalteringly Its line of foreign policy
chosen. The neutral country must each day
exert Itself to build up and cherish this
confidence. Firmness and consistency must
be shown by the representatives of the
policy of neutrality. We must make It clear
by woids and deeds that It is our intention
in the event of war to use the freedom of
action we have preserved in peace-time to
assert our neutrality. We must not give the
Great Powers any grounds for suspecting
that Swedish territory may be placed at the
disposal of another Fower and form a base
from which an attack could be launched.
Our foreign policy must not be drawn up so
as to give rise to suspicions In the country
of one Great Power or expectations In the
country of another. It must be possible to
rely on the policy we have chosen. Thus In
this respect our foreign policy aims at
gaining and retaining the confidence of the
Great Powers. 13
CHAPTER V
FINLAND AND NEUTRALITY
History . The experience of Finland with a foreign policy
of neutrality has been more difficult and more Inconsistent
than that of Sweden. The reasons for this are twofold.
First, Finland did not win her Independence from foreign
domination until rather recently. Finland has enjoyed inde-
pendence and sovereignty only since the downfall of the
Russian Tsarist regime in 1917* As one author aptly puts it,
’’The revolution gave the Finns their chance to break loose
from Russia and end their status as a duchy which had lost
Its autonomy during a period of severe repression."^ Conse-
quently, Finland has controlled her own foreign policy for
only fifty years. In such a short span, she has not been
able to build upon a tradition of neutrality. Because of this,
the credibility of her neutrality has been constantly under
suspicion from other States simply because it has not been
demonstrated to them over a long period of time that the
Finns are dedicated to the principles of neutrality. And
until their dedication was proven by their actions, the
Finns were looked upon as opportunists In International
politics whose claims of neutrality could not be taken quite
as seriously as those of Sweden or Switzerland. This remains
true even though, as Half Torngren says, "... throughout 150
^5
years of nationhood one central Idea has dominated Finnish
thinking In foreign affairs—neutrality . ’’ 2
Secondly, Finland’s close proximity to the Soviet Union
with which she shares seven hundred miles of border has
forced her to follow policies compatible with the Soviet
Union’s security Interests In Scandinavia, but which, do not
jeopardize Finland’s independence. At different times,
Finland has been forced to modify her neutral status either
because she needed outside aid against a Soviet Union threat-
ening to end Finnish Independence, or because she had to
acquiesce to Soviet security interests through bl-partlsan
treaty agreements. As a result of these two circumstances,
Finnish neutrality has been coloured by inconsistencies and
deviations from the norm. Yet, her dedication to neutrality
has never waned. It has only suffered, when conditions
warranted digression.
The inter-war period brought a stern test for the newly
independent Finland. Even though power in Russia had changed
hands-, and the new Soviet government had agreed to the Treaty
of Tartu in 1920 (which recognized Finnish sovereignty over
the Petsamo region in the north), the memories of Tsarist
repression could not be erased. Russia remained, in Finnish
eyes, the natural enemy of the country’s freedom. ’’The
Bolsheviks were suspected of relying on subversion to bring
be
back to the Soviet Union what had been lost by Russia. "3
To the Finns, the only bulwark against this new threat of
Communism seemed to be the Kaiser’s Germany whose armies,
at the end of 1917 and early 1918, were masters of eastern
Europe. The Finns made the decision in January, 1918, to
anchor Finland’s foreign policy to German support by
electing a German prince as King of Finland and by inviting
German troops onto Finnish soil.
This policy collapsed with the fall of Germany in
November, 1918. Ey this time, Finland had become compro-
mised in the eyes of the Western Powers. A complete turna-
bout in Finnish foreign policy was necessary. Consequently,
all ties with the Germans were broken. This action brought
recognition of Finland’s sovereignty by the United States,
Britain and France in Nay, 1919- Subsequent settlements with
Russia of border claims through the Treaty of Tartu estab-
lished acceptable relations with that neighbor.
With the recognition of the Great Fowers and membership
in the League of Nations,* the establishment of the Identity
of Finland as an independent State was complete. Having cut
off her early bonds with Germany, Finland was then free of
foreign political commitments. This had obvious advantages;
it also bred a feeling of insecurity. Yet, an attempt to draw
*The Finnish "government, like other newly independent
States, believed that membership in the League would give
an additional guarantee to its independent status. This
belief greatly influenced Finland’s decision to join.
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Finland Into a Nordic security arrangement failed to pass
In Parliament. ”A substantial majority was reluctant to
let the country be Involved with nations with whom Finland
had little In common. This reaction contained the seed of
a policy of neutrality
.
However, there were currents within Finland which were
far from neutral. Nationalists clamoured for liberation of
all Finnish-speaking people Inside Russia. Moreover, anta-
gonism between the Finnish-speaking majority and the Swedish-
speaking minority in Finland disturbed relations with Sweden
and other parts of Scandinavia. Max Jakobson wrote, "Finland
in the 1920* s was undecided, as it were, whether she belonged
to Scandinavia or the Baltic States. Her foreign policy in
this period is hard to define. Indeed, there was no foreign
policy to define: the League of Nations was supposed to look
after the security of Its members."^
' The 1930’s brought increasing problems to the Inter-
national community. The rise of totalitarian power In Ger-
many and Italy brought Increasing disillusionment with the
League of Nation’s ability to cope with such a menace. Left
unprotected by the Imminent collapse of the collective secur-
ity system, Finland began a search for security. What the
Finnish leaders desired was a policy of peace and. friendship
toward all and no involvement In any of the conflicts of the
B^g Powers* Their first step toward such a policy was taken
In 1932 when they signed a non-agression treaty with the Soviet
bnIon. Then, in December, 1935» the Finnish Parliament approved
a government resolution declaring Finland* s adherence to
Scandinavian neutrality. The resolution rang with the words:
’’Friendship toward all and entangling alliance with none.”^
By this time, the official policy of the Finnish government
was to preserve Finnish Independence by developing a Scandinavian
neutrality bloc. 7 The neutrality of Finland could be best
preserved In association with the other Scandinavian States of
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland whose loyalty to the concept
of neutrality was universally acknowledged.
A change In governmental leaders In 1937 opened a new
era In Finnish foreign policy. The government was headed by
President Kyostl Kalllo, a member of the middle-of-the-road
-Agrarian Party. The new coalition also Included for the first
time the Sooial Democrats as partners with the Agrarians and
the Liberals, This brought Finland In line Ideologically with
the rest of Scandinavia. It also greatly pleased the Russians,
because the new government Immediately set out to demonstrate
that there was no Finnish-German cooperation on security
arrangements. However, as tension In Europe Increased, the
Russians, fearful that the Germans would overrun Finland and,
thus, use her as a stepping stone for an attack on Leningrad,
began pressuring the Finns to accept Soviet protection and
acquiesce to Soviet military operations on Finnish soil.
But Finland did not wish to substitute Soviet for German
protection. She hoped, along with the other Scandinavian
nations, that the belligerents In a war would bypass the
Baltic region.
On the eve of war, Finland continued to demonstrate
her neutrality. After relinquishing her obligations to
the League Covenant, she and the other Nordic nations set
up rules for a common neutrality. Finland also refused to
sign the German non-aggression pact In 1939, and, even though
she had agreed to some small compromises with the Russians,
she continued to emphasize her neutrality to her neighbor.*
With the German attack on Poland in 1939, the Scandinavian
countries declared their neutrality. But the negotiations
among these northern nations to build some military under-
pinnings to the declaration of neutrality were going badly.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to pressure the Finns
for agreements which would insure Finnish and Soviet security
In case of German attack. Yet, to yield to these demands
would be inconsistent with Finland 1 s neutrality, and so she
refused. Her refusal caused the Russians to force their
demands on the Finns for the sake of Soviet security.** The
*The Soviet Union, In the meantime, moved to guarantee
her security Interests in the Baltic Region. On August 23,
1939, Hitler and Stalin signed a non-aggression pact between
their countries. This pact placed Finland within the Soviet*
s
sphere of influence.
**The Soviets wanted to push the Finnish-Soviet border
north in order to place Leningrad out of the range of modern
artillery from the Finnish side.
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Russians attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, to start
the ’’Winter War.”
Even though the Finns fought bravely and extremely
well, the war could only end In their defeat. ’’The real
problem for the Finns was to find the safest time and con-
ditions for capitulation while mobilizing outside help.
The peace of Moscow (19^0), which ended this war, was only
a signpost marking the beginning of a new period of pressure
from the Russians and Increasing counter-pressure from the
o
Germans.” The climax came when Finland was drawn Into
renewed war against the Soviets In June, 19^2; this time on
the German side. Once again compromised In the eyes of the
Western Allies because she fought on the German side, Finland
was to be left at the mercy of the Soviet Union when peace
was finally reached In 19^*
For the Finns, this was unfortunate not only because
of the harsh peace terms Imposed on them by Russia but also
because throughout the course of the war, Finland had con-
tinually emphasized that her conflict with the Soviet Union
was separate from the bigger conflict raging in Europe.
During the Winter War, she had solicited aid and arms only
from neutral Sweden in the attempt to retain some semblance
of her neutrality in the Big Power struggle. Unfortunately,
when the second war with Russia broke out I n 19^1 > ^ Innlsh
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objectives had shifted from neutrality to one of regaining
what It could from the losses of the Winter War. Thus, she
could only expect to be chastized by the Allies at the end
as a co-belllgerent with Germany in the war against the
Russians. Her desire for revenge left her open to the "Dra-
conian peace" administered by the Soviet Union upon the
cessation of hostilities.
Finland and Cold War Neutralism . The development of
Finnish neutralism can be categorized Into three stages:
the early post-war years from 194*1-1948, culminating In the
signing of the Finnish-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty in
1948; the period from 1948-1955, generally recognized as
the rebirth of Finnish Independence and neutrality; and,
finally, 1955 through the present, a period of expansion
and maturing for Finland* s foreign policy of neutralism.
The fall of 1944 brought to the Finns the realities of
wartime cooperation with the Nazi Germans. Defeated in
the two-phase war of 1939-44, caused by two Soviet attacks,
the Finns were left by the acquiescing Western Allies to
accept, unaided, Russian armistice and peace terms whereby
Finland was to be crushed without military conquests The
terms called for territorial concessions,* destruction of
German military capability in Finland and a huge reparations
bill of |600 millions. It was the large reparations payment
*71nnlsh forces were to withdraw behind the 19^0 borders,
and Petsamo was to be ceded to Russia.
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that was most harsh in Finnish eyes, because it seemed to
mean annihilating economic servitude which would eventually
lead to default and occupation by Russian troops.
However, Finland did actually manage to avoid Russian
occupation after the war, partly because Finnish military
forces were still in fighting condition. The Russians by
then knew of the Finns’ determination to remain Independent
and did not want to face that resilience on the battlefield
again. Yet, the threat was to remain for many years to
come,. Consequently, the most important problem facing
post-war Finland was not the reparation, reconstruction and
resettlement left by the War. The single most important
ta. k was the development of a credible foreign policy which
would find acceptance with the Russians and would maintain
Finnish Independence and security. Half Torngren wrote,
’’The failure of neutrality in 1939 bad been due primarily
to the profound mutual distrust that had then prevailed
between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government
at that time had had no faith in Finnish neutrall ty . . . .The
foremost task of Finland’s post-war policy, therefore, was
to gain and secure Soviet confidence in Finland as a peaceful
neighbor."'*'0
The initiation of a foreign policy with special regard
to Russian Interests came as a result of the election of
Juho Faaslklvl, a Conservative, as president of Finland in
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1 i 021 tha i, point on, Finland's foreign policy has been
under the considerable influence of this man. It is he and
his disciples who have forged the specific interests of
Finland into a policy of neutrality and non-alllance through
the past twenty-five years. There are many who claim that
the ’’Paasikivi Line,” as this policy has come to be titled,
has enabled Finland to remain free and independent. It is
surely responsible for keeping the Russian bear at bay,
satisfying that nation's security interests in the North.
Paaslklvi's policy was aimed at reassuring the Soviet
Union that her vital security interests were acknowledged
by the Finns. The "Paasikivi Line” is based on the assump-
tion that the Soviet Union's interest in Finland is pre-
eminently a security Interest, and that occupation and
satellization are not necessary to Insure achievement of this
objective. He, therefore, followed a conciliatory line
toward the Russians. Even before he became president,
he had held the view that Finland's security and preservation
of independence rested on maintaining good and credible
relations with the Soviet Union. In a speech on October 15,
1944, he addressed himself to this Issue:
Dominating everything in Finland's foreign
policy is our country's relationship with
our big eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union.
That is our real problem in foreign policy....
Finland's foreign policy must be directed in
such a way in the future so as not to go against
the Soviet Union.
H
5^
Paaslkl vi also asserted that If the readiness and willingness
to fight were me de known to the world, Russia would respect
Finland* s Independence. These Ideas represented the be-
ginnings of a policy of neutralism. However, It would not
be until 19 55 that Finland would be able to practice openly
such policies. It had to first convince the Soviets that the
Finnish adherence to such principles was credible.
In summary of these early Paaslkl vl years, It appears
correct to say that Finnish foreign affairs were wholly
dominated by a determination to avoid all things that might
offend the Soviet Union. The pre-1939 ‘Scandinavian orient-
ation, so important In Finnish contacts with the outside
world, was muted. The earlier policy of strict neutrality
and no alliances with or commitments to the Powers still
remained, but the anxiety to please Russia caused what many
came to see as a new pro-Russian orientation.
The beginning of the second stage in the post-war
development of Finnish foreign policy parallels the Initial
signs of thaw in Finnish-Soviet relations. By 19^7. the
conciliatory policies of President Paasikivl toward the
Russians were showing definite results. The Soviet leaders
demonstrated their pleasure with Finnish policies by easing
war-reparation payments, giving numerous trade concessions
and showing a rare tolerance for Finnish acceptance of loans
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from Sweden and the United States. Finland, on the other
hand, continued to demonstrate her recognition of Soviet
interests and, at the same time, collect credit towards a
policy of neutrality. She refused to participate in the
Paris Marshall Plan Conference in 19^8 because:
...The Marshall Plan having become the
source of serious differences of opinion
among the Big Powers, Finland, desiring
to remain outside the areas of conflict
in Big Power politics regrets that it does
not find it possible to participate in said
conference.
The start of the cold war brought more concessions by
the Russians to Finnish desires for neutrality. They chose
to treat Finland as an example of Soviet good neighborliness
in the attempt to offset her ruthless actions to her neigh-
bors in Eastern Europe.
In April, 19^8, Finland and the' Soviets signed the Treaty
of Mutual Assistance. The preamole to this Treaty was important
to the Finns because in it the Soviets acknowledged Finland*
s
’’desire to stay outside the conflicts of Interest between the
great powers. This was the first instance of Soviet acknow-
ledgement to Finnish neutrality contained in public record since
the war.
However, there were many people who accused the Finns of
compromising their new neutrality by signing the Mutual Assist-
ance Treaty. They said that it tended to color Finnish neutrality,
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because it gave the Soviet Union rights of transit and lease
of a military base In Finland. Others rose In defense of the
Treaty. Half Torngren Is one of those who contends that
neutrality and the Treaty are compatible:
Purists may object that the commitments
undertaken by Finland In the Treaty are
Incompatible with a neutral status. It
must be remembered, however, that those
comml tments apply solely to the defense
of Finland* s own territory. In this, the
Treaty Is unique among the numerous
security arrangements made by the big
Powers and It Is worth noting that an
authoritative Soviet commentary has
called It an agreement for the guarantee
of neutrality to distinguish It from the
mutual assistance pacts the Soviet Union
has concluded with other countries. From
the point of view of the theory of neutral-
ity this may be an unorthodox Interpretation.
But the Treaty reflects the reality of the
Finnish situation. It is indispensable for
the creation of confidence without which the .
neutrality of Finland would be built on sand. :
The second phase In the development of Finland* s post-
war neutrality ended In 1955 with the renewal of the Mutual
Assistance Treaty. During this time, Finland continued to
project herself as a legitimate neutral In the cold war while
reassuring the Soviets that they did not contemplate any move
which would threaten her security. By 1955, it was abundantly
clear that, while her position was far from secure, Finland
was not a hostage In the hands of the Soviets. In the ten
years since the war, Finland had paid off her war debt to the
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Soviets and was now ready to take an active role In the
development of the world community. With her admission
into the United Nations in 1956 and definite modifications
in the "Paaslkivi Line" due to the retirement of the old
statesman, Finland now sought to pursue an active policy
of neutralism.
The Soviet withdrawal from the military base at
Porkkala. in 1955 opened the way to International recognition
of Finnish neutrality. So long as the Finns could not have
full sovereignty over her territory, others would not
recognize her claims for neutrality in case of war. Now,
after ten years, that recognition was forthcoming.
It is felt by the Finns that as long as they follow
the broad outlines of the "Paaslkivi Line," the Soviet Union
does not feel threatened and will respect Finnish Independence.
The post-Paasikivi government of Urho Kekkonen of the Agrarian
Party, a strong supporter of the "Paaslkivi Line," has con-
tinued to respect this fact. But it has also endeavored to
modify and broaden that policy. While Paaslkivi, through
force of circumstance, had concentrated on improving relations
with the Soviet Union, Kekkonen has ventured into the Western
world and beyond. "It is in the area of Flnnlsh-Scandinavian
relations that one can say that President Kekkonen has stepped
beyond the *Paaslkivi Line.* Finland*s foreign policy is now
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characterized by a ’line of active neutrality’ which Is In
contrast to the more passive Paaslklvl policy. Kekkonen’s
visits to the Western nations of Britain, France, the United
States and the leading countries of the » Third World 1 ' have
brought pronouncements of recognition of Finland’s neutrality
from those countries. This has done much to dispel the idea
that Finland Is a satellite of the Soviet Union. Soviet
Premier Khruschev aided the credibility of Finland’s neu-
trality with statements such as: "The policy of your state
—
a policy of neutrality and independence, a policy of the
struggle for peace—favorably influences the setting In the
northern part of Europe."^'
Through the above discussion of Finland’s experience at
neutrality, it can be argued that the Finnish concept of
neutrality is a result and part of a historical process
rather than the product of abstract thought. It is designed
to meet the realities of power rather than the precepts of
international law; it is a response to the challenge of
external circumstances which link Finland to the West with
ties of history, ideology and economic advantage, yet place
her within the scope of vital Soviet security Interests and
within the Immediate reach of Soviet military power. It is
at the same time bold but restrained. It is bold in the
sense that it ardently protects Finnish independence,
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confessing to all its willingness and determination to
remain free. Yet, it is restrained by the proximity of
the Soviet Union and limited by shying away from big-
power politics and refusing to take sides in the cold
war. Max Jakobson wrote, "Finland has adopted a more rigor-
ous concept of neutrality by proclaiming her determination
to stay outside the conflicts and controversies between
the Big Powers, not only in time of war but also in peace.
The pattern of Finnish neutrality is demonstrated in her
attitude toward the German question.. She has chosen to
recognize neither German State in the attempt to show her
impartiality. Yet, she has managed good relations with both
sides, having trade Interests in the two parts of Germany.
Neither does she recognize sides in Korea or Vietnam. ".Any
attempt to fit this policy (Finland’s neutrality) Into the
framework of International law would be a desperate under-
-i p
taking. But, In practice, it has served Finland well ."-1- 0
The Finnish experience in the United Nations has been
much like that of Sweden. Through this international organ-
ization, the Finns have been able to broaden the "Paaslkivi
Line." Within the confines of the United Nations, they have
worked for peace in the world and for the lessening of tension
in the cold war. Membership in the United Nations has also
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benefited Finnish claims to neutrality, as her actions In that
organization lend credibility to her status. Finland considers
her activities In the United Nations as her primary opportunity
to practice ” active neutralism.” As long as she maintains her
aloofness In Big Power conflicts, her status of neutrality
cnnot be questioned.
Finland has recently taken steps to bolster her neutrality
by developing her domestic defenses. In 19 6l, President Kekkonen
announced that: ’’Finland Is moving toward a more sophisticated
defense policy designed to support her policy of neutrality In
moments of International crisis.
”''L
' She bought from the Soviet
Union Mlg fighter planes with air-to-air missiles. She has an
acceptable air defense. But, of course, these measures will
not Insure her neutrality or security. Her policy is aimed at
keeping out of war.
Summary . The Finnish practice of neutrality is strikingly
similar In many respects to that of her Nordic neighbor, Sweden.
However, the fact that she is an Instrumental part of the Soviet
security interests has made a great deal of difference and
has been an ever-present burden on Finnish foreign policy. The
Finns have always tried to demonstrate a willingness to develop
cordial relations with the Russians. They have had a hard time
convincing them of their sincerity. It is a tremendously
frustrating position that the Finns are in, because, with every
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decision that they make, they must take Into account possible
Russian reactions. Yet, they have adapted to the cruel real-
ities of their circumstances and have managed to delicately
place themselves in the envious position of non-alllance and
neutrality. Max Jakobson, In his book, Finnish Neutrality
,
explains the strategy and the rewards of the Finnish foreign
policy:
Finland has consistently pursued a policy
that has satisfied the Soviet craving for
security. Finland has also maintained
her Independence and pat'llamentry demo-
cracy in the sense that the Western Powers
understand these terms. Finland Is friendly
to the Soviet Union without being subserv-
ient; she is a Western democracy without
challenging Soviet security. As a conse-
quence, Finland has hardly even been men-
tioned in the disputes and quarrels between
East and West: the cold war has passed her
by. 20
CHAPTER VI
SWITZERLAND AND NEUTRALITY
El story . The history of Switzerland and her foreign
policy of neutrality can easily lead to the Illusion that
there exists In the central part of Europe a genuine utopia,
populated only by peace-loving and righteous people who
over the past 150 years have done no wrong. Such an Il-
lusion can be readily accounted for If one considers the
numerous conflicts and fIght-to-the-death wars which have
occurred all around, this European mountain haven over the
last 150 years. To be sure, much of the Illusion can be
verified. Switzerland has not been a battleground for any
conflict In a century and a half.* She has managed, to
maneuver away from entangling alliances that could only have
spelled her doom. Her people have come to look upon them-
selves as peace-loving as Is consistent with their long
tradition of neutrality in peace and war. Yet, when one
delves Into the particulars of Swiss foreign policy, It
is readily determined that her neutrality and long tradition
of peace are not based simply upon a love and yearning for
peace. It is less fashionable but more accurate to explain
” l _ until the end of the Napoleonic wars, Switzerland
was Involved in the conflicts of Europe,
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Switzerland’s successful experience at neutrality by
exploring such factors as her geographical position, her
geological advantages, the willingness of the big
powers to recognize her policy as credible, her domestic
anatomy and finally her readiness to defend her status
with arms.
The notion of Swiss neutrality is older than the notion
of a Swiss nation. It has deep roots in the history of the
individual cantons as well as the Swiss confederation. The
term "neutrality” was first used in an official document in
1536. But the origins of the official policy are usually
traced to a declaration of the Federal Diet in 167^ to the
effect that Switzerland Intended to adopt a "neutral position"
in the war between France and the Netherlands.1 This declara-
tion was an attempt by Swiss statesmen to protect their
country from entanglements In the recurring wars that were
characteristic of the European balance-of-power system. How-
ever, neutrality at this time was as much a necessary condition
of internal stability as of external security. For a country
which contains three official languages and two religions and
whose unity is achieved only by due respect for all these
different elements, neutrality in foreign affairs was and is
a necessity. The Swiss experience with the diverse elements
of religion in the seventeenth century demonstrated this fact.
As Peter Lyon stated, "The Swiss could only retain their
Identity and their freedom In diversity by a policy which
accommodated theological differences within the Confeder-
ation but forbade an active bias towards ones co-rellglon-
lsts abroad.”
^
These early beginnings of Swiss neutrality were further
enhanced by several other factors. Geographically, Switzer-
land Is situated In Central Europe, a position which would
tend to make her a pawn in the power politics and struggles
of that continent. Fortunately for the Swiss, her powerful
enemies of France, Austria, Spain and the Netherlands nullified
each other* s designs on Switzerland by maintaining a precarious
balance of power in that region. Other elements are more
conspicuous. The mountainous topography of Sx^ritzerland makes
it difficult to successfully Invade this country by foot
without sustaining heavy and, in most cases, unacceptable
losses. Switzerland is essentially a mountain fortress with
almost Impregnable natural defenses which have stood the Swiss
in good stead these many years. The absence of any natural
resources to capture and the military preparedness of the
Swiss army also helped to guarantee her policy of neutrality
from its very beginning. Yet, despite these advantages, Swiss
neutrality was stymied by her involvement in the Napoleonic
wars of 1798-1815. As a result, the contemporary period of
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Swiss neutrality dates from the Congress of Vienna of Nov-
ember 20, 1815, which established the permanent neutrality
of Switzerland as guaranteed by the Great Fowers, Cyril
Black writes:
In 1815 the Congress of Vienna agreed on
the neutralization of Switzerland as part
of a general settlement after the bloody
upheavals that had been touched off by the
French Revolution and Napoleon* s drive for
a continental empire. The powers assembled
at Vienna were concerned with stabilizing
the European system, which to their way of
thinking at the time was the core of the
international system. The neutralization
of Switzerland though only a small part of
the total settlement, was a conscious act
of preventive diplomacy. It was meant to
thwart any upset of the new balance of power,
particularly an upset engineered by any power
or coalition of powers conquering or bring-
ing into a military alliance this sma_ul country
which had common boundaries with France,
Austria and several German and Italian states
and which controlled vital lines of communi-
cation. J
Through the declaration at Vienna, the status of Swiss
neutrality was established as it largely remains today.
The importance of the Congress of Vienna rests in the fact
that for the first time the permanent neutrality of a small
State became part of the law of nations. More important
to the Swiss was that from the Great Power acknowledgement
of their neutrality came the implication that Switzerland
had ceased to be a keypolnt in the European order. This
implication arises directly from the 1815 Congress of Vienna.
h
T
he signatory Powers recognized the neutrality of Swl tzer-
land and proclaimed that her inviolability and her independence
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from any Influence are In the Interest of Europe.
While the 1815 Agreement obligated the Great Powers
to guarantee the neutral status of Switzerland, the Swiss
also were made accountable to such actions Intended to
demonstrate her commitment to that status. She was obli-
gated, as Is any sovereign State which has been neutralized
by International agreement, to refrain from using its
military forces for any purpose other than self-defense
or the maintenance of International order, to stay clear of
any military or political alliance, and to refrain from
allowing other States to use tier territory for military
purposes.
Even though the Agreement was unique in the sense that
it sought to insulate Switzerland against certain forms of
International rivalry and was to be a technique for con-
flict avoidance, it was not a drastic changeover for the
Swiss. The principle of neutrality embodied in the 1815
Agreement had firm roots In Swiss policy. It was more the
formalization of existing Swiss policy than the creation
of a new policy. Indeed, although from a legal standpoint
the neutral status of Switzerland is based on the treaty of
1815, from a practical point of view, it is an example of
self-neutralization rather than neutralization by international
C7
guarantee. In fact, the Irony of this Is that as time passed,
the so-called guarantors of Swiss neutrality noted In the
1815 treaty became the principal threat;, to her neutral
statue. Switzerland could less and loss depend upon the
Great Powers for security. She finally came to rely upon
her own forcer: of defense as her guarantor.
Since 1015, the Swiss have sought to maintain a con-
sistent policy of neutrality. It has not been an easy
task. With the continent of Europe continually embroiled
In one conflict after the next, Switzerland has often found
herself pushed to the brink of war. This was especially
true In 191^ and. 19^0 as the German High Command In both
wars seriously considered Invading Switzerland. Yet, the
Swiss managed to escape, their neutrality unsol led and,
In fact, enhanced because of their, unwillingness to com-
promise their status In spite of considerable danger.
Swiss neutrality was also reinforced over time because of
her role as a center of International finance and commerce
and as headquarters for a wide variety of International
organizations. Up until the end of the Second World War,
Switzerland had made only one concession or deviation In
her neutrality. That was her membership In the League of
Nations after World War One. Even this move can hardly be
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considered a deviation. Switzerland joined the League under
special circumstances intended to maintain her neutrality,
yet which allowed, her to participate In that organization.
Fost-wai Fold Kn Foil c.v . Switzerland, like Sweden, Is
a neutralist State in the sense that she Is not a member of
any cold war alliance. Only In this limited yet Important
respect can she be considered neutralist, for the vast
majority of her citizens consider themselves a part of the
Western world. In the years of the cold war, the Swiss still
cling to their cherished national traditions of non-involvement
in military alliances in peacetime and of neutrality in war.
In order to demonstrate the consistency of her neutral stance,
we can examine the official interpretation of neutrality
adopted by the Political Department of the Swiss government on
November 12, 195^ • In It, we can see the guidelines of the
past and present policy of Swiss neutrality.
This document begins by noting the essential difference
between customary and permanent neutrality. The former in-
volves only non-participation In war between States, while
the latter requires neutrality In time of peace as well as in
time of war. (The Swiss consider themselves under the commit-
ments of permanent neutrality as guaranteed by the Great Fowers
In 1815.) The document then goes on to explain the principal
bbllgatlons of a permanently neutral State In time of peace.
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They are: "...to abstain from starting a war, to defend its
neutrali ty, and to avoid policies and actions that might on
some future occasion Involve It In hostilities."-
More specifically, the Swiss interpretation states that
a. permanently neutral State must not adhere to any treaty.
Including defensive treaties and collective security arrange-
ments. Nor must it conclude any military agreements. The
restriction on ties to other States Is limited to political
and military t^es and does not, In the Swiss view, extend to
treaties for nonpoll t l cal or humanitarian purposes. Partici-
pation of the permanent neutral In International conferences
and organizations with universal membership Is questionable
In the Swiss Interpretation because of the rival political
I
groups which may exist In such organizations. This point of
view explains, in part, th« Swiss refusal to join the United
Nations, although this question Is still open for debate within
Switzerland.* While they hold this view, the Swiss carefully
confirm their right to offer their good offices or mediation
even during hostilities without hindering their Impartiality.
Economically, a permanent neutral must not enter Into a
customs or economic union which limits her political activity.
To do so might mean the political Involvement of the permanent
neutral with other States. Finally, the document concludes
that the obligations of neutrality should be narrowly inter-
preted, and that "...when Switzerland undertakes policies that
-*See pages 7^ end 75 for reasons why Switzerland joined
the League of Nations,
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go beyond those called for by customary or permanent neu-
trality, they should be regarded not as the fulfillment of
obligations but as measures designed to strengthen the
confidence of belligerents In the Institution of neutrality.”^'
With a close examination of the specific actions of
the Swiss government since 19^5, It becomes apparent that
Swl tzerland* s neutrality Is consistent with the above Inter-
pretation. It 1
s
; especially true upon examination of her
adherence to the three obligations of a permanent neutral In
peacetime. She has started no wars nor was Involved in any
during this perlcd. The backbone of her neutrality Is her
adherence to armed neutrality, and she has taken steps to
update her defenses. Finally, her refusal to Join the United
Nations Is In the strictest sense her pursuit of non-involve-
ment In the power politics of the International community.
Switzerland* s P . rrned Neutrality . Even though the Swiss
have avoided actual military conflict for a considerable time,
they have not been lulled Into thinking that It is simply
because they are 8 peace-loving people. From the early days
of their neutrality In the European wars of the eighteenth
century, they have constantly been prepared to defend their
country should the need arise. Even after the Great Power
guarantee of Swiss security was given at the Congress of
Vienna In 1815, the Swiss maintained their highly respected
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military preparedness In case that guarantee failed to
materialize. It has already been noted that because of
her efficient army and mountain fortifications, Switzerland
escaped German invasion in 1914 and 1940. Through these
years, the task of maintaining an efficient, modern, up-
to-date military defense capability has constantly occupied
the Swiss government. As a result, Switzerland has never
been a burden on her neighbors for defense. She has always
remained self-reliant for her security. By arming her moun-
tain redoubt to the teeth, she has been able to ward off all
aggressors by simply raising the cost of her capture to a
point where it has, until now, been completely unacceptable
to an invader. It Is a policy which has the full support of
the Swiss people. It is a policy which has instilled pride
,
In them, because the guarantee of the guarantor States has
lost much of its meaning. Moreover, It is a policy which has
worked.
However, the advent and use of air power during World
War Two produced a serious challenge to Switzerland 1 s formerly
Impregnable mountain fortress. With air power, It is no
longer necessary to go through the teeth of the Swiss defense.
It is now possible to fly over it and drop bombs into the
Swiss valleys.* Moreover, with the arrival of the nuclear
*It is the same situation which the British found them-
selves in. The realities of German air power over London
during World War Two made the British realize that suddenly
the English Channel, In a sense, had dried up.
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bomb, the whole question of Swiss security and Independence
,
can be settled with a few well-placed bombs. It Is a
circumstance vrhlch has threatened to shatter Switzerland*
s
armed neutrality ever since World War Two.
Nevertheless, the Swiss have attempted to cope with
these new realities of the Nuclear Age. It has required
a complete revamping of Swiss defense strategy. They can
no longer depend upon the Alps’ mountain ranges surrounding
the Swiss valleys to protect them In the same manner as
before. The Alps can and do serve a valuable service to
the Swiss* new concept of defense, however. Besides their
historic role as protector against land Invasion, the Swiss
use the mountains for storing foodstuffs and war material
in their vast natural caverns. They serve as bomb shelters
and as a natural civil defense system. The Swiss also use
the mountains for their air defense system* They have hard-
encd missile sites and anti-aircraft gun emplacements strung
throughout.
In the early 1950* s, the Swiss military planners devised
a new strategy for defending Switzerland from the modern
weapons of war. Instead of the old strategy of a “static
defense,” where the army would hold off the invaders as long
as possible and then retreat to a mountain redoubt, the new
concept calls for increased flexibility in the armed forces.
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The new army was to be a mobile one, having the capacity to
move quickly from one Swiss frontier to the other. More
Importantly, the Swiss built up their airforce. In 1950
,
they bought 100 British Hunter Jet fighters to bolster their
air capabilities.* They have placed heavy emphasis on civil
defense by employing radar with infrared equipment, not
only In the mountain areas but also in the valleys. It Is
estimated that at least one-tenth of the population serves
in the new mobile civilian army. More recently, Switzerland
has outfitted her forces with tactical nuclear weapons to
fully modernize her fortifications. In 1954
,
over 400 million
Swiss francs went for defense, and that figure Is now undoubt-
edly higher. Finally, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles
are stockpiled in the mountain caverns along with the con-
ventional weapons of war.
Given these improvements, it would seem that the Swiss
have maintained a credible defense In spite of the new cir-
cumstances facing them. But, that credibility has yet to be
tested, and until It is, the traditional Swiss policy of armed
neutrality remains in abeyance. Yet, having nothing to
replace it, the Swiss must depend upon it for their security,
if they hope to remain neutral.
*In 1962, the Swiss ordered from France the Dossault
Mirage III fighter jet.
^ ‘
' *nd x- t * Solidarity
. In many
circles, it is a little known fact that Switzerland does
not belong to the United Nations. Such a circumstance
raises genuine surprise upon its discovery, because the
Swiss have the reputation of being the most pacifist and
humanitarian people in the international community. There-
fore, it is automatically assumed that the Swiss would be
a stalwart supporter of an international organization such
as the United Nations whose announced purpose is peace.
This assumption is not far from correct, because the Swiss
have chosen to support the United Nations from without.
This position is predicated on two elements; first, Swit-
zerland^ experience as a member of the ill-fated League
of Nations and secondly, the political nature of the United
Nations as suggested by its charter.
In 1920, Switzerland joined the League of Nations after
a bitter domestic debate resulted in a narrow victory at the
polls for the proponents of membership.. The controversy
over membership actually arose because of the obligations of
members to employ sanctions against an aggressor State. Such
provisions are noted in Article 16 of the Covenant:
1. Should any member of the League resort to
war on disregard of its covenants under Articles
12, 13
,
or 15
,
it shall ipso facto be deemed to
have committed an act of war against all other
Members of the League, which hereby undertake
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immediately to subject it to the severance of
all trade or financial relations, the prohibition
of all intercourse between their nationals and
the prevention of all financial, commercial or
personal Intercourse between the nationals of
the covenant-breaking State and the nationals
of any other State, whether a Member of the
League or not.
2. It shall be the duty of the Council In
such case to recommend to the several
Governments concerned what effective mili-
tary, naval or airforce the members of the
League shall severally contribute to the
armed forces to be used to protect the
covenants of the League. 7
This requirement is completely Incompatible with the obli-
gations of permanent neutrality as practised by the Swiss.
But the League decided to make an exception for Switzerland
in order that she might join. Under the new arrangements,
Switzerland was not bound to participate in military oper-
ations or sanctions Instituted by the League. However, she
was bound to participate in economic sanctions. These
measures were taken on Switzerland’s behalf In order that
she might maintain her neutrality while participating in the
International organization. ’’This compromise arrangement
g
was referred to as * dl fferential* or ’qualified* neutrality.”''
The Swiss found membership in the League an uncomfortable
position even with their ’’associate” status. The Swiss*
participation in purely economic sanctions was not without
its political trappings. The failures of the collective
security system resulted in the ’’political” application of
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economic sanctions so that those States participating In
such actions were Involved In political dealings. Switzer-
land was In danger of losing her neutrality If she continued
along this course. In 1938, no longer able to accept these
conditions, Switzerland requested to be released of her
obligations to the Covenant. She was restored to her former
status of "unqualified” neutrality by the League.
When the question of membership In the United Nations
arose after the Second World War, the experiences of the
League were still fresh in the minds of many Swiss who feared
Infringement upon their neutrality. The second basis for
the Swiss rejection of United Nations’ membership lies in
the basics of the Charter. Although the Charter is more
flexible than the Covenant, there are, nevertheless, serious
problems regarding the compatibility of membership In the
United Nations and permanent neutrality. Under Article 43,
members may be called upon by the Security Council to apply
military and economic sanctions against any State found guilty
of a breach of peace. Furthermore, Articles 2 , 3, ^1,
and 43 of the Charter show plainly that Its spirit and text
are opposed to a fundamental neutrality such as is and has
been for 150 years, the cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy.
Article 4l implies that members of the World Organization are
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bouhd to give the United Nations every assistance any
action It may take and to refrain from giving assistance
to any State against which the United Nations arc taking
preventive or enforcement actiond Furthermore, It was
one of the conditions of admission to the San Francisco
Conference In 19^5. at which the Charter was adopted, that
States demonstrate their desire for peace by declaring war
on Germany and Its allies.
Much of the Swiss argument for not joining the United
Nations was discussed In 19^6 by William E. Rappard, an
authority on Switzerland.* Rappard* s position is based upon
his study of the powers given to the Security Council by
the Charter. He finds that all nations, when they join
the United Nations, surrender to the Security Council their
right to peace and war. (This being true of all nations
except the five big powers with veto power in the Security
Council.) Moreover, he asserts that ’’...for Switzerland to
consent to act upon the Instructions of the Security Council,
a body on which it is neither directly nor indirectly repre-
sented, would be to forfeit its claim to national Independence.”'
He further argues that the United Nations should not ask
Switzerland to abandon Its neutrality, and that Switzerland
*Rapparc?
,
U. e7, ’’The United Nations and Switzerland,”
Annals of the American Academy of Folltical and Soci --'1 Sd r ncf .
2« 6: “64
-71, July, 19^6.
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should -be given some kind of United Nations’ "associate”
membership along the lines of the League’s compromise.
xj.e feels that there is a valuable place for Swiss neutrality.
There was also great reluctance by the Swiss to accept
membership in the United Nations because of the power
politics inherent in any organization of universal member-
ship. It was felt at this time that the United Nations
would be a political organization, and that it would be
practically Impossible for the Swiss to remain outside the
political arena should they join. (The basis for this
argument has largely been eroded by the success of other
neutrals in the United Nations to remain outside the
politics of that organization. Also, the United Nations has
not turned out to be as politically oriented or active as
was previously predicted.)
Because of these and other reasons,* the Swiss have
not applied for membership in the United Nations. Though
the debate over this issue continues even today, the conflict
between neutrality and internationalism has been solved or
overcome by the Swiss acceptance of a humanitarian and
other non-political missions. Although she does not belong
to the United Nations, Switzerland is one of the most
*A sample poll of Swiss citizens resulted in these findings
52,000 polled.
In favor of unconditional neutrality: 58 . 8%
In favor of United Nations membership, b„.t keep
neutrality: 38.2$
In favor of abandoning neutrality: 3$
"International" countries in Europe; one of the most open
to the external world. The Swiss consider it their duty
to ease the plight of the world. Moreover, "Switzerland
is so well aware of the danger of being imprisoned in its
neutrality ... .that it does not neglect any occasion for
making effective, whenever possible, its participation in
an international organization." 1 "' .Among her many member-
ships in international organizations affiliated with the
United. Nations are membership in the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Inter-
national Refugee Organization, the International Court of
Justice, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-
national Postal Union, the International Labor Organization
and many more. Geneva has been called the "International
City," because many of these organizations have their head-
quarters located there. The most significant of these is
the International Red Cross.
Finally, "Switzerland seems almost as if fated by Its
geographical situation, as well as prepared by Its history,
to fulfill the international, duties closest to the root
idea of neutrality.""^ In fact, the Swiss consider inter-
national solidarity as the natural complement of neutrality;
the only means of giving it positive value and the only way
to reconcile the need for security of a small nation with
the promotion of an international community. It 1 s these
goals that the Swiss tirelessly pursue outside the confines
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of United Nations membership.
Summary
. Our discussion of Swiss neutrality has failed
to distinguish major differences resulting from the advent
of the cold war from those of her historical period. Such
a distinction was necessary with the policies of neutrality
of Sweden and Finland. However, in most respects, the cold
war has not been a major Influence for change in Swiss policies.
Since 1815, under the form of permanent neutrality, Switzer-
land has clung to neutrality In times of peace and. war.
Moreover, her claims have for the most part been respected
by the international community throughout the many changes In
the political climate. In fact, her concept of neutrality
has come to serve as the example for those States portraying
themselves as neutral in the cold war. It serves as a credible
example to follow, because Swiss neutrality is held In great
esteem, both inside and outside of the country.
Although Switzerland refrains from Involvement in inter-
national politics, hers is not a policy of isolation and never
has been. Because her neutrality has the confidence of the
international community, she does not find herself limited
to those policies of strict neutrality as does a nation like
Finland which must find ways to enhance her credibility. She
can take a more practical approach, because, for the most
part, Switzerland sets the standards for neutrality. Swiss
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"practical neutrality,” though It may diverge slightly from
"legal neutrality,” Is likely to find favorable responses
among the Great Powers. These powers realize with what
reverence the Swiss hold to neutrality, and that they are not
about to jeopardize their privileged position.
The Swiss are fervently neutral today, because they
are fervently Swiss. They realize that had It not been for
the neutrality of their country in the past, they would long
since have lost thei r national unity and, indeed, forfeited
their national existence. One observer noted that "A foreig-
ner who observes from the outside this peaceful and prosperous
country does not always grasp the effort required to insure
its stability, to smooth out the inevitable tensions which
crop up in a multilingual country, and to compensate for
t.he attractions exerted by the various national cultures.
This small nation is more sensitive and vulnerable than sur-
face appearance indicates, and the neutrality which the Swiss
cantons have been led to adopt to maintain the federal link
remains today the cement of their unity. ” The mere renun-
ciation of neutrality would split the confederation *nto two
or three parts, none of which could avoid an alliance with
more powerful neighbors.
Finally, "...the maintenance of neutrality really does
rest in the last resort upon their (Swiss) own strength and
this In turn Involves three things: the unity of the cantons,
eternal vigilance, and the willingness to carry the heavy
personal and. financial burden of defense."^1 ' These burdens
have been accepted willingly by the Swiss, because they know
the rewards of such responsibilities by far outweigh the
cost
.
CHAPTER VII
AUSTRIA AND NEUTRALITY
History
. Unlike the three previously cited nations of
Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, Austria has no historical
tradition of neutrality. Austrian neutrality dates hack to
only 1955 when the four powers of the Soviet Union, England,
France and the United States agreed to the Austrian State
Treaty, establishing the permanent neutralization of that
nation. Indeed, Austria has held statehood only since 1919 .
Previously to that, what Is now modern or present-day Austria
was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For centuries,
this Empire was a formidable Great Power of the European
continent. Ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty, it was constantly
embroiled in offensive and defensive military conflicts
which were due to either the aggressive aims of the Haps-
burgs or to Austria’s central geographic position is Europe’s
backdoor guardian against Asian conquerors, notably the Turks.
Because they were an Instrumental part of this Empire and
holders of a great amount of power, the Austrians have never
had to rely upon the politics of neutrality to insure their
security. Consequently, they have been on one side or the
other in all of Europe’s classic conflicts.
The history of Austrian statehood since 1919 has been
a storayand uncertain one. The peacemakers of 1919 took
the truncated rump of the Hapsburg Empire and constituted
the Republic of Austria. Comprised mostly of German-
speaking peoples, Austria lacked either the will or the
means to existence. Between the wars, it scarcely had an
active foreign policy. Politically, many Austrians wished
for an Anschluss with Germany. This was forbidden by the
Allies in the Treaty of Versailles. Economically, Austria*
s
existence depended on numerous loans from the League of
Nations. However, once the depression hit, this aid was
suspended. Austria found herself pressured more and more,
both internally and externally by the German National Social-
ist propaganda, that the only solution to her desperate
straits was union with Germany. In March of 1938, Hitler's
Germany forced through the Anschluss , crushing Austrian
independence. Thus ended the Austrian's brief but heroic
struggle for independence. Gereld Frankenstein depicts
Austria's inter-war condition rather eloquently when he
wrl tes
:
Were I to choose a symbol of Austria's
struggle in the years following the first
world war, I would choose the famous group
in the Vatican called Laocoon—Laocoon
fighting heroically and desperately against
the overwhelming pressure of the serpents,
his two sons around him, almost succumbing,
lifting their arms for help.-
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World War Two ended with Austria liberated from Nazi
rule but occupied by the four victorious allies. Despite
promises of a quick "Austrian solution,” the Allied occu-
pation lasted, for ten years. During those years, she became
a fecal point In the cold war, thus creating almost insur-
mountable obstacles for settlement. Neither the East nor
the West was willing to abandon Austria to the other. "Aus-
tria depicts a snail rowlngboat in a storm sea with a crex^
of lbur elephants each pulling in a different direction.”
0
Moreover, the deadlock over Austria led most Austrians to
believe that the^r country would be the prize over which
World War Three would be fought. "They see their country
as the cockpit In which at Austrian expense the Pour Great
Powers fight out their economic and political rivalries
today; tomorrow they fear it may be the scene of the out-
break of a. more bloody conflict.”-
i
Austrian State Treaty . When the announcement of the
Austrian State Treaty was made in 1955, there was understand-
ably much surprise in both cold war camps. The groundwork
for the agreement had been laid by careful Austrian diplo-
macy. In 19 /49
,
the government announced that it would accept
a treaty without a guarantee of its protection as it hoped,
for protection by the United Nations. Using the good offices
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of India to promote Austria* s cause with the Soviet Union,
agreement to Austrian Independence was reached In Moscow
on April 15, 1955 •* After nearly 300 fruitless Elg Power
negotiation sessions since 19^ 6
,
compromise and agreement
were reached on the four-power evacuation of Austria. Those
agreements are embodied in the Austrian State Treaty.
The Issues of Austrian neutrality and independence were
actually negotiated on a bi-lateral basis between the Soviet
Union and Austria. After two days of negotiations in Moscow,
the Austrians and Russians concluded the "Moscow Memorandum”
on April 15, 1955* Under the terms of this formal agreement,
"Austria accepted the obligation to practice permanent neu-
trality of the type maintained by Switzerland, to obtain from
the Austrian parliament a commitment to permanent neutrality,
to take appropriate measures to obtain international recog-
nition of this neutral status, and to request and accept a
guarantee by the four powers of the inviolability and integrity
of the territory of the Austrian state. The Austrian dele-
gation gave assurances that "...the Austrian Republic Intends
not to join any military alliance or permit military bases
on her territory and will pursue a policy of independence in
regard to all states."' Other commitments given by the
*The Soviet Union was fearful that the Western Allies
might halt their quest for a united Austria and. Incorporate
the Western zones into NATO.
8 ?
Austrians Included reparations 1 payments to the Soviet Union
of 150 million dollars and the delivery of one million tons
of crude oil annually over the next ten years. Most important
to the Soviets was the Austrian acquiescence to make a
declaration "...in a form imposing upon Austria an inter-
national obligation, that Austria will maintain permanent
neutrality of the same type as that maintained by Switzerland.
The Soviet Union, on its part, agreed to recognize the declara-
tion of neutrality and to participate in a four-power guaran-
tee of Austrian territory.
The four-power guarantee came one month later in Vienna
with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Tt provided
for the establishment of a sovereign and democratic Austria
within the frontiers of 1938- (Articles 1 and 5)* The rights
of non-German minorities were guaranteed, and an Anschluss was
forbidden (Articles A and 7)» Austria was allowed to keep
an army of whatever size it wished, but atomic weapons were
forbidden (Article 13)* There were to be no reparations
except those cited in the Moscow Memorandum (Articles 21
and 22).
From the Austrian point of view, the very heart of the
Treaty is Article 20. It terminated the four-power control
in Austria and provided that the occupying forces were to
be evacuated within ninety days. The Great Poi\rers, both
Allied and Associated, promised to support the Austrian
application Into the United Nations. Surprisingly, the
Treaty has no mention of Austrian permaneny neutrality.
However, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed that
the four powers, ”... shall respect and observe a statement
of Austria’s permanent neutrality of the kind observed by
Swi tzerland ."
‘
Such a statement of Austrian neutrality was soon
forthcoming from the Austrian parliament. On October 26,
1955, that body enacted the Constitutional Law of Neutrality.
Article I reads:
(1) For the purpose of the lasting maintenance
of her Independence externally, and for the
purpose of the Inviolability of her territory,
Austria declares by her own free will her
perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain
and defend this with all means at her disposal.
(2) For the securing of this purpose in all
future times, Austria will not join any mili-
tary alliances and will not permit the estab-
lishment of any foreign military bases on
her territory.
°
Nations of the international community were quick to
respond to the State Treaty and to the Constitutional Law of
Neutrality. Acknowledgements by governments such as the United
States were soon forthcoming. ’’The Government of the United
States has taken cognizance of this Constitutional Law and
recognizes the perpetual neutrality of Austria as defined there!
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Needless to say, there was much speculation as to why
the Soviet Union, after conceding nothing on Austria for
nearly ten years, apparently did a complete about-face.
Rome think that Russia agreed to the State Treaty because
she wanted to make Austria an example for the other small
Western European nations to follow Instead of their joining
NATO. She hoped that Austrian Independence through neutral-
ity would act as the lure to these nations. Others speculate
that ” ...from the Soviet point of view, Austria* s neutral
freedom was simply a Danublan sprat to catch the German
mackerel. Here again, the Austrian example Is to serve
as enticement for a neutral Germany. Still others point to
the desire of the new Soviet leaders to appease the West
in the post-Stalin era of co-existence or cite with some
credibility the Soviet desire to sever NATO military lines
of communication from Italy to Germany and. fears of exposing
Russian soldiers to the corrupting luxury of Western life.
No matter what the reason or reasons for Soviet con-
cessions, the fact remains that Russian acquiescence to
Austrian independence via neutrality paved the way to the
re-establishment of Austrian sovereignty. Whether the
prolongation of that sovereignty depends on continued Soviet
acaulescence is as yet an unanswered question. It is, however,
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as serious a consideration for the policy makers of Austria
as i 1 is for Finland. In many ways, it is the key to
Austria's policy of neutrality.
*
”stri °r Neutrality
. The development of guidelines
for a policy of Austrian neutrality began In 1956. Adjust-
ments In that policy continue even today, depending upon
the political environment in which such a policy must exist.
Nevertheless, there are several set themes for Austrian
neutrality which have emerged since 1956, and which, for
the most part, probably will not change drastically.
The broad and formal guidelines for Austrian neutrality
were explained in 1953 "by Dr. Bruno Krelsky, former Austrian
foreign minister.* He explains that ’’Actually it is not
accurate to speak of neutrality in peacetime because what
the term means is non-participation in war.’’--- Eut, he claims
that neutrality does Impose certain obligations in peacetime
as well. These obligations are:
(1) A neutral country cannot Join a military
alliance in time of peace.
(2) A neutral country must bar military bases
from its territory.
(3) A neutral country must not accept any
commitments—economic or political which
would jeopardize its neutrality in time of
war •
Austria follows these minimum obligations of neutrality
A ffai
•M
rs
Krelsky, Bruno, ’’Austria Draws the Balance,
,
January, 1959, PP« 269-281.
it Foreign
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1n the strictest sense, since her most pressing goal has
been to build credibility for her neutrality. Apart from
these obligations, Austria has developed a foreign policy
which is more flexible than her European neighbor of
Switzerland. Moreover, the statement by Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov that Austrian neutrality should develop
along the lines of the Swiss example seems to be completely
out of context with definite historical facts which prevent
the use of the Swiss model for Austria.
Furthermore, the reference to Swiss neutrality as a
model for Austria is Irrelevant and impractical, because the
Austrians have no tradition of neutrality from which to start.
A tradition of neutrality and the faith in such a policy
cannot be accomplished overnight. It took Switzerland over
two hundred years to evolve her ties to neutrality, and it
cannot be expected that Austria would accomplish such a
process in a decade or even two decades. History and the
fluctuations in political environments simply do not suggest
such an occurrence.
Statements by the Austrians at the Berlin Conference
of 195^ clearly outlined, the major definitions of any Austrian
neutrality. "It is the desire of the Austrian people to live
in peace and friendship with all nations. Austria desires
to make the principles of the United Nations Charter her own
9 ?
and to become a worthy member of that great family of
nations. ” But Austria doesn’t want to become politically
Isolated. They want to keep friendly relations with all
states, her political orientation is, however, towards
the West. It was for this reason that Austria joined the
United Nations in 1956 soon after gaining her independence.
She Joined, because it would bring her intematl onal recog-
nition. Also, ’’Such membership implied a measure of security
which we could not have found elsewhere.” '3 This was the
first major indication that the Swiss model would, not snrve
Austria well, and that there were necessary departures from
that model. Austria has used her membership in the United
Nations to activate her neutrality in a positive direction.
Her humanitarian orientation was clearly demonstrated during
the Hungarian Revolt of 1956. She has continued those acti-
vities through the United Nations organ* ^tl ons
.
What has occurred in Austria Is that ’’...since the State
Treaty. . .Austria has developed a new kind of neutralism,
something less negative and more actively European in spirit
than the neutrality of Switzerland.” 1^ This European spirit
has been greatly aided by the domestic situation within
Austria which finds a coalition of Christian Democrats and
Socialists governing effectively. This is important, because
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1 serves as a showcase for other European nations x^ho maj^
be having difficulty reconciling the two dominant European
political trends represented by these two groups.
It has become clear that the Austrians, while embracing
neutrality In the military sense, reject It Ideologically.
They have strong cultural and historical ties with the West.
’’Neutrality with us is not a state of mind. We will promise
to enter no military alliance and to allow no foreign bases
on our soil. Beyond that, we are of the West, and our hearts
cannot be neutral.”^ ' She has consistently promoted this
position by joining the United Nations In 1966, expanding
trade with the West, joining the Council of Europe In 1966
and soliciting loans from the United States Instead of the
Soviet Union. But her most daring actions in this direction
were during the Hungarian revolt of 1956 when she actively
aided refugees fleeing the Russians and when she exposed
and destroyed a Soviet front organization In Austria. Both
actions brought vocal threats and objections from the Soviets,
but, In turn, the actions procured acknowledgements of
admiration and respect from the rest of the international
community. Furthermore, when Chancellor Julius Raab, knoxrn
as the ’’architect of Austrian neutrality,” proposed Ideologi-
cal neutrality in hopes of not offending the Russians and
possibly securing agreements from them to lessen the reparations
9 **
payments, he was opposed and defeated In 1956 by others,
such as Foreign Minister Leopold Fig] who said: "We are
militarily a neutral State but there Is no neutrality of
spirit for us, and therefore no ’neutralism*
'
In 1956,
upon being threatened by the Soviets for their actions
during the Hungarian revolt, Chancellor Raab, who reversed
his stance, answered those threats by stating that Austrian
neutrality does not mean "a colorless neutralism In politi-
cal questions."'1'?
By i960
,
two themes had emerged from the conflict
between Austrian’s Western conscience and her Eastern
commitments to neutrality. First was the Government’s
determination to make Its foreign policy pragmatic, not
predetermined by any model such as that of the Swiss.
Secondly, Austrian neutrality was only In the military
sphere. President Adolf Schaerf’s announcement In 1957
confirms this position. "We attach great Importance to our
neutrality being regarded as a military one. In other aspects
and particularly In all questions of culture, we do not wish
] 8
to be tied to any historically molded, pattern."
Austria’s practice of pragmatic neutrality Is not without
limitations. That ’s, the Austrians realize that It was
Soviet agreement to their neutrality which enabled them to
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gain the* r Independence ana rid their country of the occupation
forces. Their leaders are not about to turn their backs on
the Russian bear and Its desires. To be sure, Austrian
leaders have so far been able to successfully thwart Soviet
threats and demands upon their practice of neutrality. Tut
the hard questions still exist; how much does Austrian Inde-
pendence depend upon Soviet acceptance of Austrian policies?
How far can the Austrians venture without antagonizing the
Kremlin and pushing the Soviets Into a "Hungarian or Czech-
oslovakian solution? It Is a situation which Austrian diplo-
mats, like the Finns, have to be constantly aware of. (There
are elements w*th!n Austria who do push for an "appeasement
policy." These forces warned against the joining of the
United Nations, because it would bring too much international
attention on Austria and might contain political trappings
which a young neutral could not cope with. They also argue
against close economic ties with Western Europe for fear that
they would antagonize Russia.)
Despite the International guarantee of its neutrality
embodied in the Austrian State Treaty, the presence of Russian
tanks and soldiers on Austrian border^ during the Hungarian
Revolt in 1956 brought home to the Austrians that "...the
simple fact of being legally in the right has never in history
saved any country from having its neutrality violated by another
IQ
country...." Like the Swiss,
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Swedes and Finns, the Austrians
realize that the best guarantee of permanent neutrality is
a strong army and the unshakable determination to defend thi
s
neutrality. Consequently, Austria has built up her defenses
in order to guard her position. Because of the ban on atomic
weapons placed on her by the State Treaty, she can never
hope to have an adequate defense against any nuclear aggressor.
Any thoughts of defending successfully her neutrality by means
of arms are pure fantasy as long as the restrictions remain.
Fortunately, she has yet to depend upon her inadequate defenses
for her guarantee. She, like Finland, must rely upon a policy
of keeping out of war.
Summary . Neutral Austria is in an unique and unenviable
position of having common frontiers with two Warsaw Pact
States (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), two mainstays of NATO
(Italy and. West Germany) and two other countries, neutral
and uncommitted like Itself (Switzerland and Yugoslavia).
Consequently, "Austrian neutrality ’s only a function of
international eauili bri um. . . . It follows then that Austrian
foreign policy must always aim to help maintain the balance
of power by contributing in all ways possible toward lessen-
ing international tension." ^ The examples of Switzerland
and Sweden suggest that a successful neutral needs, as well
as care and restraint in her external policies, national
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unity and stability in her internal policies, economic
viability and military strength sufficient to deter any
would-be aggressor from an easy conquest. Up to the
present, Austria 1 s leaders have demonstrated ample skills
in their diplomacy, but it is too early to be confident
of the country* s internal unity or its economic strength.
Austria’s leaders have already shown concern over her in-
adequate defenses. The failures of the balance of power
have historically taken their toll of neutral States who
depended upon that delicate balance of forces for their
security. "It would be rash to assert that the post-1955
neutralization of the Austrian Federal Republic is deeply
21
entrenched. So far, it has not been severely tested." '
Meanwhile, Austrian diplomats remain adamant in their
practical neutrality w^.th the country’s ties to the West
and its economic concessions to the Soviets. Despite its
drawbacks and limitations, neutrality for. Austria has meant
Independence for the last fifteen years. It has also meant
international recognition for that State. This was clearly
underscored by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in observance
of the tenth anniversary of Austrian independence in 1965
when he concluded:
While fully honoring her international obli-
gations under the treaty and scrupulously ad-
hering to the policy of neutrality which she
adopted in October, 1955. Austria has not
hesitated to follow an independent and positive
foreign policy in the interests of international
Justice and peace.
PART III
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
CHAPTER VIII
THE FOUR EUROPEAK NEUTRALS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Introduction
. In Part II, we discussed the general
policies of neutrality practised by Austria, Finland, Sweden
and Switzerland in order to illuminate the basic guidelines
of ' neutrali ty followed by each individual State and to clar-
ify the political environment from which such policies evolved.
It was made clear that although these four States definitely
have a Western orientation in terms of history, culture and
political ideology, this does not lessen their commitment to
neutrality or non-alllance. But most important in the dis-
cussion of these four neutrals is the acknowledgement that,
though they may have much in common, each adheres to a speci-
fic form of neutrality dictated by its own Interests and by
its position vis-a-vis the cold war antagonists. More speci-
fically, the different political environments in which these
four States maintain their Independence create differences
in the interpretation of neutrality. This has resulted in
the practice of neutrality at various levels, some rigid,
others more flexible and practical in regard to specific
Issues confronting these nations.
Cne of these issues where the different levels of neu-
trality become apparent is European integration* Because
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both the United States and the Soviet Union have different
conceptions of a United Europe and because the Impetus of
the current Integration movement has come from and Involves
only the western half of Europe, the neutral States desiring
to associate with the Integration movement find themselves
faced with numerous dilemmas. The desire for security
creates the dilemma of association or non-assoclatlon with
a military alliance system. .The desire for economic growth
and stabilization produces a dilemma over economic associ-
ation with some parties at the exclusion of others. Finally,
the desire for neutrality poses a dilemma between political
Isolation and International cooperation. In most cases,
these dilemmas add up to a choice between survival or extinc-
tion, militarily, economically and politically. Thus, the
European neutral Is faced with many difficult decisions con-
cerning Its role in the integration movement. How these four
neutrals have reacted to these dilemmas presented by efforts
of European unity Is the subject of Part HI.
We shall be examining some regional organizations In
which these four neutrals have either joined, seek to join
.or have debated joining. This examination will enable us
to see clearly the dilemmas faced by these nations as they
seek to maintain their neutrality. But more Importantly,
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such an examination should illustrate the varying degrees
of neutrality practised by each, relative to its political
circumstances in regard to the specific issue of European
integration. Specifically, we shall examine the European
regional organizations of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
Of these two organizations, only in EFTA do any of the four
neutrals actually hold membership. (Austria, Sweden and
Switzerland are full members while Finland is an associate
member.) Because of the political nature of the Treaty of
Rome, none of the neutrals at present hold full or associate
membership in the EEC. (Austria, Switzerland and Sweden
have sought associate status.)
European Integration . Since the closing stages of the
Second World War, there has been a movement toward greater
European unity. The nations of Western Europe have come to
realize the vast economic and social advantages of removing
the barriers between them and working together on the many
common problems. Most of the success in this endeavor of
unifying the nations of Europe has b^en in the economic
sphere. Indeed, as long as membership in the European instl
tutions required no sacrifice of a State's sov ignty and
independence, most of the nations of Europe, including
the neutrals, have been very willing to participate in
> 0 ?
integration. In many ways, thr one claim to success of such
organizations as the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC)* and the Council of Europe ^r that they have
^een able to solicit nearly all of the nations of Western
Europe as members. This Is sol ely because they require no
subjugation of Individual States* political rights ns a
prerequisite for membership. Yet, neither do they represent
much of an accomplishment in the integration process other
than as symbols of intent.
On the other hand, the creation of common institutions
requiring members to sacrifice a bit of their sovereignty
has been largely unsuccessful. The movement of the Euro-
pean federalists for political Integration has found stiff
opposition in several nations of Europe, notably Erl tain
and the European neutrals. For Britain, with her Common-
wealth ties and her tradition of Isolation from the con-
tinent, political integration would mean the scrapping of
that tradition, plus ties with her former Empire. For those
nations attempting to maintain neutrality in time of peace
and war, political integration Is out of the question.
While they do endeavor to participate in international schemes
of economic and technical cooperation, they are opposed to
*Now Organization for Economic and Cultural Development
(OECD)
.
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any form of political alignment which might endanger their
neutrality.
The reluctance on the part of Britain and the neutral
nations to agree to the political unification of Europe
meant that as long as the goal of unanimous membership in
the common institutions remained, there would be no sign-
ificant political integration. Consequently, the early
years of integration were concerned with such organizations
as the CEEC where strict economic cooperation made wide-
spread participation possible. The creation of the OEEC
in 19^8 was solely to achieve the economic recovery of war-
shattered Europe, and its success was ensured by total
cooperation from the European nations.
Spurred on by the success of the OEEC, some Member
countries of that organization made plans for further cooper-
ation through inter-governmental institutions. They proposed
to fully integrate their national economies by means of common
institutions under a common authority. In 1951 1 under the
guidance of Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, the
six Member States of Belgium, France, the German Federal
Republic, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands created a common
market for coal and steel known as the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC). Subsequent accomplishments of this
"Community method" include the European Atomic Energy Community
1EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC), both
springing from the twin Treaties of Rome in 1957.
It is at these points in time that the movement to
integrate Europe begins to separate. The negotiations
for a supra-national authority, envisaged by the Six in
ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC, marked a parting of ways between
those States such as Britain, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland,
who sought only economic cooperation and the six Member
States advocating the "Community method." By their actions,
the Six demonstrated that they were ready to oush ahead with
the unification of Europe in order that they might benefit
from the advantages of coordinated political and economic
policies. The leading federalists, such as Robert Schuman
and Jean Monnet, were willing to abandon their goal of unani-
mity, hoping that partial integration would convince the
reluctant States to abandon their traditional concepts of
neutrality or Isolation.
It was at this point that the dilemmas of European
integration began to arise for the four neutrals. For with
the success and growth of each community organization, especi-
ally the EEC, the neutrals* self-inflicted isolation brought
Increasing symptoms of economic hardship. , for them to
join these experiments in supra-national communities would
i°r
mean abandonment of their neutrality and probable political
adversity. Thus, their choices wer?' narrowed to: continued
isolation, experimenting in political integration or seeking
an alternative economic organization to combat the EEC. That
they chose the third alternative is hardly a surprise con-
sidering the consequences of the other two. By creating the
European Free Trade Association ( EFTA ) , these nations would
reap the benefits of economic cooperation that they had real-
ized in OEEC, while simultaneously they did not have to make
any concessions on their neutrality.
European Free ^ode A ssoci atlon "nd Fin? and . At a. meeting
of the OEEC Council in July, 1956, while the drafting of the
Rome Treaties for the EEC and EURATOM was still in progress,
Britain put forward the idea, of an all-European free trade area
embracing the "Six” and other European countries. The British
proposals envisaged the abolition of all tariffs and other
barriers to trade between the Member States over a period of
years--at the same time allowing each Member to retain for
itself the freedom to determine tariff levels and trade policies
towards third countries. These proposals received unanimous
acceptance within the framework of the OEEC. Negotiations
for such a plan were initiated but soon broke down because of
the withdrawal of French support. The problem was not that
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the British suggestion? were not feasible but that the "Six”
and particularly the French Government- found It Impossible
to change their position, namely, that the Treaty of Rome
had created a new situation to which the rest of the European
nations had to adapt their policies. In other words,
In the economic relations of Western Europe non-dlscrimination
on an OEEC basis had come to an end; to re-establish the
economic unity of the Continent, Britain and Scandinavia was
a task of the future,’’'1
In response to the discriminating attitude of the ’’Sly,”
a group of seven countries, -Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kindgom, now known as the
"Seven,” sought to form a free trade area among themselves.
Their a*m was to create favourable conditions for forming a
free trade area embracing all of the CEEC countries. In the
meantime, -they felt obliged to confer the advantages of free
trade on their own populations who numbered approximately
ninety million people. While they hoped to demonstrate that
the free trade area technique was workable and In the end
advantageous, It is more accurate to say that the EFTA was
created in response to the discriminatory and selective EEC.
The "Seven” felt obliged to offset as much as possible the
economic advantages resulting from membership In the EEC In
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order to protect themselves Individually.
After six months of negotiation, the Convention estab-
lishing EFTA was completed and Initiated in Stockholm, Sweden,
on November 20, 1959* The principal objectives of EFTA are
found In Article 2. They are:
a) to promote sustained economic activity, full
employment, increased productivity and optimum
use of resources, financial stability and con-
tinuous improvement of living Standards;
b) to ensure that trade between the Member States
takes place under conditions of fair competi-
tion on terms as nearly equal as possible;
c) to avoid significant disparities between Mem-
ber States in the conditions of supply of raw
materials produced within EFTA
;
and
d) to contribute to the expansion and harmonious
development of world trade and to the progress-
ive removal of barriers to It.
Apart from these objectives of operation, the signatories
had two primary alms In mind; to promote arrangements with
the EEC which would lead to the establishment of a single
European Market, and to create among themselves a free market
within which trade could take place unhampered by tariffs
or other barriers.
The absence of any political alms by the EFTA Is not
purely happenstance but rather by design. It was the poli-
tical obligations of the Rome Treaty of the EEC which aroused
opposition to it and made It impossible for any of the ’'Seven"
to join, especially the neutrals. The cooperation provided
for by the EFTA Convention is. In fact, essentially commercial
in nature with few direct and immediate obligations bearing on
the economic and social policies of the Member States. The
EFTA countries set out to do something less than the EEC. They
had no political federation in mind. Economically, they argued
that it was possible for countries with disparate economic
structures to do Intelligent business together without committ-
ing themselves to institutions encroaching upon traditional
areas of national sovereignty. Like the CEEC, the EFTA pro
vlded slight difficulties for neutrals because 4 t was purely
economic and followed voting rule and decision- making via
unanlml ty
.
Yet, the establishment' of EFTA did create grave problems
for one of the neutrals—Finland. Unlike Austria, Sweden
and Switzerland, Finland’s neutrality and Independence hinge
on placating the Soviet Union. Finnish sovereignty is so
tenuous because of her important security position in regard
to the Soviet Union, that strict observance of neutrality Is
a necessity. It Is through the Finnish dilemma over membership
in EFTA that we begin to .see definitive differences in neu-
trality among the four neutrals. Because EFTA Is a purely
economic organization, It raised little or no problem for
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Eut because It is also a
purely Western European organization and excludes countries
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from the Eastern or Soviet bloc, for Finland to participate
^n it might be construed In Soviet eyes as partial or discrim-
inatory neutrality. Desiring to guard against such an inter-
pretation and knowing that they would feel uncomfortable In
their neutrality should they join EFTA
,
the Finns decided
against full membership.
With the signing of the Stockholm Convention In 1959,
It soon became apparent to the Finns that If they were to
survive economically and, In the end, politically, they
must establish some method of collaboration with EFTA.
Already by 1957. because of high inflation and Industrial
conflicts over prices and wages, it was obvious that unless
Finland could remain competitive In her western markets,
she could be absorbed Into the Soviet orbit. Moreover, the
Soviets were pushing for stronger Soviet-FInn economic ties
by way of Increased trade. Isolation from her Western
markets would come to mean economic dependence on the Eastern
bloc nations, principally the Soviet Union. It would also
mean a huge cut In foreign trade for the Finns. At Its
highest, the share of the Eastern bloc In Finnish foreign
trade was 30 per cent. Usually, It amounts to only one-
fifth of the total. Three-fifths of Finland^ total exports,
chiefly wood and wood products, are sold In the thirteen
countries comprising EFTA and EEC. While Finnish exports
no
here about equally divided between the two Western European
organizations, the creation of the EEC, Important though it
was as a marketing area for Finnish forest articles, did
not In itself signify a direct threat to Finnish export
competition. This was due to the fact that the principal
countries competing with Finland In the export of forest
products were also outside the EEC so that Finland was not
placed In an unfavorable position In relation to them.
However, with the Implementation of the EFTA
,
Finland*
s
chief competitors In forest articles, Sweden and Norway,
gained a decided advantage because of the lowering of tariffs;
thus endangering Finland’s competitive position. Korrover,
EFTA Included Finland’s biggest customer, Britain. To
remain outride of EFTA would considerably weaken her position
In the British market and would endanger the large-scale
Investments made In her wood-processing Industries, as well
as generally diminish the prospects of Finland’s foreign trade.
Further complications arise when assessing Finland’s
bilateral trade with the Soviet Union. In 1959, Finland’s
mxportr to the Soviet Union amounted to 16.8 per cent of
the total value of her exports. Close to two-thirds of the
products sold to the Soviet- Union consisted of machines,
appliances and transportation equipment. Although only 7 per
Ill
cent of all wood and wood products exported by the Finns
went to the Russians, the Soviet share of her exports In
metal and engineering products was as high as 72 per cent.
These figures Indicate roughly the importance of the Soviet
Union as a market for Finland’s metal Industries. In order
to retain this market, the Finns must maintain a level of
imports roughly equal to Its exports. To reach agreements
with the EFT/i countries which would have the effect of
damaging the Finnish-Soviet trade In this vital area would
be totally unwise and untenable.
The need for collaboration with EFTA became more acute
when the other Scandinavian countries, with whom the estab-
lishment of a Nordic. Customs Union had been under discussion
for two or three years, now announced that In view of the
altered circumstances created by the EEC and the EFT/', they
were no longer interested In such a project. As Relno Rossi
states, "Thus the only possibility that existed for Finland
to safeguard her commercial Interests In Western Europe was
that of endeavoring to Join EFTA." Finland’s adherence to
neutrality meant that It was as Impossible for her to Join
the EEC as It was for iSweden, Austria and Switzerland. Her
economic future In Jeopardy if she continued her isolation,
Finland was left with little choice.
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The Stockholm Convention provides for partly peti on
In EFTA without being a full-fledged member. Article 4 l
states that States may apply for full or associate member-
ship In EFTA . ”The Council may negotiate an agreement
between the Kember States and any other State, union of
States or International organ!.zati on. The association
agreement negotiated by the Council may provide for ”...
such reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and
special procedures as may be appropriate.”^
By means of Article 4 l, the Council of EFT" was provided
with a great amount of leeway *n handling membership appli-
cations of countries with such complex problems as Finland's.
The EFTA members, well aware of the economic and politic
consequences should Finland be forced to remain outside tl e
western trade markets, were anxious to Include her as an
associate member. Eut In doing so they dared not force her
to accept any obligations which would endanger her neutrality
or her commercial agreements with the Eastern bloc.
Finland, on the other hand, also anxious to participate
In the free trade area, realized that any move on Its part
must be made with caution and In consultation with the
Russians. Therefore, during the negotiations with EFTA, wh 1 ch
began In January, i960, the Finnish Governemt devoted Its
primary attention to three points. First, the establishment-
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of relations with EFT? must not lead to the creation of any
supra-national body that would restrict Finland’s right of
self-determination. Secondly, the Finns aimed at an agree-
ment such as would take Into account the social and economic
circumstances of the country, ensuring a sufficient period
of adaption, particularly for some branches of the home market,
finally, the agreement should be of a nature such as to enable
Finland to fulfill and to honor all previously concluded
commercial treaties. This last point was specifically intended
to guard the Soviet-FInni sh trade relationship.
Needless to say, this last point was the primary issue
throughout the negotiations, and It proved to be the most
difficult to implement. By Nay of i960, a draft agreement,
signed at Lisbon, essentially fulfilled the first two basic
requirements. The EFT? countries demonstrated great under-
standing of the difficulties in adapting Finland's industries
to the new circumstances. Reduction of duties was accomplished
in accord with EF1? standards, thus ensuring Finland a com-
petitive price on the Western market. Finally, the EFT? made
a concession to Sovlet-Finnish trade. Finland obtained the
right to retain i.n force some quantltati x’e Import restrictions
on liquid and solid fuels as well as fertilizers In order to
guarantee the import-export balance existing between Finland
and Russia. Here again, the EFT? countries demonstrated their
recognition of the special circumstances surrounding Finland*
s
neutrality and Soviet interests.
The third aim of the Finnish Government was not solved
by the Lisbon draft. It posed a more difficult problem
because the Finnish-Soviet trade agreement contained a most-
favored-nation’s clause. Since the Soviet Union was not a
member of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
and thus not bound to accept the limitations imposed by mem-
bership in a free trade area oi r customs union beyond the.
operations of such a clause, its' •’wrldical validity was
beyond dispute. Actually, only a small portion of the Soviet
Union’s exports would have been affected by tariff reductions,
but the Finns felt that an Important 1 ssue of principle was
Involved . Seeking to placate the Soviet Union and not affect
Its own interests, President Kekkonen sought to reach a nego-
tiated solution acceptable to both the EFTA and the Soviet
Union. Because he did consult the Soviet Union on this step,
and because he had been communicating with Moscow over EFTA
membership since the negotiations began, Kekkonen encountered
stiff opposition from within Finland. The. feeling was that
the Austrians had not consulted the Russians when they Joined
the EFTA as a full member, and that for President Kekkonen
to do so was ,a slap in the face to Finland’s independence.
Nevertheless, Kekkonen desired to confer with the Soviets
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concerning a new customs treaty on * new bae 1 r which, whi^r
guaranteeing the commercial benefits of the Soviet Union on
the Finnish market, would be compatible with the EFTA and
^a_tt principles. Such an agreement was re^c 1 ed 4 November,
I960
,
during President Kekkonen's visit to Moscow, it the
same time, Soviet Premier Khrushchev Issued a communique
granting Finland permission to become a qualified member of
EFTA in order to ”... remain competitive in western markets.’’^
This statement gave Kekkonen and the Finns the confidence
to accept associate membership in the EFT/' in March, 1961.
-Although associate membership in a non-political
organization such as the EFTA seems like a small and unim-
portant step to most, the fact- that the Finns considered it
a momentous achievement of their foreign policy illustrates
clearly the major facet upon which their neutrality is based.
Despite their assurances to the Soviets of their unrelenting
dedication to neutrality, to make even the smallest move
toward the West presents the Finns with a major foreign policy
dilemma. That their practice of neutrality must be more rigid
and stricter than any other neutral in Europe was illustrated
when they attempted to take the smallest of the small steps
to integrate Europe. And the Finnish dilemma is by no means
over. The question still remains as to what she will do if
the EFTA members choose to Join the European economic Community.
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How her trading Interests can test be safeguarded In the event
of an enlargement of the EEC Is a future problem for Finland.
Until the shape of that Community Is established such a ques-
tion cannot be answered.
The Euro;- r Economl c Communl ty
.
Sweden
.
Austria and
Cirl t o y>
'
1
.
~ n
"
. The establishment of thr European Economic
Community in 1957 under the guidelines of the Treaty of Home
represented the culmination of the "Community method." Tt
also represented, a unique chapter In the history of European
Integration. The sly nations of France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands
took the first step toward full economic and, hopefully,
political Integration of Europe. For the first time, agree-
ment between several nations of Europe established a common
market under a supra-national authority.
The EEC was not to be only a customs union but a full
economic union. Such a union requires common policies for
agriculture, social affairs, transport and energy, a common
trade policy, common rules ensuring fair competition, freedom
of movement for workers, goods and services and the harmoni-
zation of fiscal, monetary and financial policies.
1 commission
was established of representatives from the six countries to
oversee and Implement the organizations activities. mhe
Commission holds responsibility for Initiating association
11?
agreements with. other nations of the world. It also Is to
represent the ’’Six” In negotiations concerning International
trade and tariffs. Decisions made by the Commission, whether
they be economic or political, are held to be binding on all
Member States. Though the main emphasis of the Community is
on economic Integration, the ultimate objective is the politi-
cal unification of Europe. The six nations which signed thr
Treaty of Rome in 1957 fully understood and intended that to
be their goal.
While the creation of the EEC was a hi story-making step,
It did divide Europe politically and economically, Because
thr Treaty of Rome required the sacrifice of some sovereignty
on the part of Members, there were a number of States who
would not join. .Among these States were the four neutrals
of Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Finland who for reasons of
neutrality could not agree to the obligations of the Treaty of
Rome. To do so would limit their independence of action
economically. Tt might also bind them to certain political
policies which would hinder their neutrality. .As was dir-
i .
cussed above, these countries, along with Britain, Portugal,
Denmark and Norway, formed the EFTA in hopes of countering
the economic discrimination of the EEC.
By I960, it was apparent that the EEC was quickly be-
coming a powerful force within Europe. Likewise, it was
obvious that several members of EFT," were rot benefiting by
their association with that organization. This was especially
true of Britain. She had not joined the EEC because It would
have meant breaking off her ties with the Commonwealth nations
with whom she has a special relationship, both politic and
economic. But It was now apparent that the Commonwealth and
the rest of the EFTA nations could no longer provide the mar-
kets essential for the rejuvenation of the British economy.
Unless they found new markets for their exports, the British
could not hope to rectify their balance of payments. This
meant more austerity, more devaluation of the pound and con-
tinued economic lag for a nation desiring to re-establish
herself as a major world power.
Given these circumstances, the Conservative government
of Harold Macmillan decided to discard the tradition of Iso-
lation from the European continent, as It was no longer feasible
economically. Consequently, on December 19, 1961, the British
Government formally applied for full membership In the EEC.
The decision by the British Government and subsequent
applications by Norway and Denmark to the EEC had drastic
effects on the remaining members of EFTA. If Britain, Norway
and Denmark gained membership In the EEC, It would mean the
end of the EFTA. Those nations remaining outside the EEC
would then face economic discrimination, a situation that
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would be hard to endure. They also would be excluded from
the movement to Integrate Europe on a wider scale. This
could lead to political Isolation from the rest of Europe
at a time when the political Identity of that Continent
was developing.
The prospect of British membership In the EEC and the
consequences that It held for EFT/ created serious dilemmas
for the European neutrals. Because of the non-political
nature of EFTA
,
the neutral nations of Austria, Sweden and
Switzerland felt very comfortable In their membership. To
a lesser degree so did Finland. Their status of neutrality
thus ensured, they enjoyed the common tariffs and customs
of the free trade area. But with the proposed enlargement
of the EEC to Include some EFTA nations, thus wrecking the
latter organization, the neutrals would be again open to
economic discrimination. Yet, because of the political nature
of the Treaty of Rome
,
they could not be members of the EEC
and maintain their neutrality.
The gravity of the neutrals 1 economic situation can bn
illustrated by examination of their Individual trade statistics.
In 1961, Austrian exports to EFTA and EEC member countries
were 65 per cent of her total while Eastern Europe received
only 1^.6 per cent. Her dependence on the West was even
more noticeable for Imports: 72 ‘3 per cent of Austria»s
imports came from EFT/' and EEC countries as against only
10.4 per cent from Eastern Europe. Swiss exports to EFTA
and EEC nations amounted to 59.2 per cent as compared with
3«° per cent for Eastern Europe. Her Imports from EEC and
EFTA added up to 75- 2 per cent as against Imports from the
_art at 2
• 3 per cent • Finally, Sweden's economic dependence
upon the West Is even more pronounced. In 1961, Swedish
exports to EEC and EFTA nations amounted to 73.8 per cent of
her total while the Eastern countries took only 4.2 per cent.
The figures for her imports were 68.2 per cent from the EEC
and EFTA versus 4,4 per cent from the Eastern countries.*
These figures Illustrate well that the neutrals are economi-
cally dependent on Western European markets. More dramatic
are the figures Indicating the amount of trade difference that
exists between the neutrals' Import-export trade to the EEC
and EFTA.
TABLE I**
Year Austria Sweden Sw 1 tzerland
1961 Export to EEC
(1962)
49-5*
51%
33% *u.5*
1961 Export to EFTA 57% 6 5% 52*
1961 Import from EEC 49 . 5$ 40% 62.5$
1961 Import from EFTA 12.7# 26 . M ro • 0
"*From CECD Statistical Bulletin, Series A.
## it »t ii ii
121
The significantly higher percentages of trade between
the neutrals and the EEC show that for them to remain outside
the EEC trade markets could be disastrous, especially as
their economies are largely dependent on foreign trade.
Exclusion from the EEC would also mean serious dislocation of
trade for them.
The European neutrals are conscious of their economic
dependence on the West. But they are also aware of the poli-
tical entrapments contained in EEC membership. Desiring to
remain neutral and at the same time economically healthy,
the governments of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland sought
a solution to the dilemma created by pending British member-
ship. The solution which they arrived at was association with
the EEC, provided for in Article 238 of the Treaty of Home.
Article 238 makes provision for the conclusion of associ-
ation agreements between the community and third States. It
reads:
The Community may conclude with a third country,
a union of States or an international organi-
zation agreements creating an association em-
bodying reciprocal rights and obligations, Joint
actions and special procedures.
Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council
acting by means of a unanimous vote and after
consulting the Assembly.
This Article was drafted in rather broad terms. This was done
deliberately so that it may be more useful and valuable by
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what It permits than by what it contains. However, because
It Is so broad, It is subject to different Interpretations.
For this reason, the Commission prepared a memorandum on
February 26
, 1959 , setting down an attitude toward association.
The characteristics of association are: that It is to be
essentially flexible in form and in the connection it may
establish between the Community and the associated State, and
that association must, whatever its form, be directed
toward the guiding objectives laid down In .Article Two
of the Rome Treaty, Tt must tend, therefore, "To promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased
stability, an accelerated rising of the standards of living
and closer relations between its member States.
Association provides an alternative to full entry into
the Community and allows the associated State to establish
an important structural link w^th the Community. But it
must never be confused with entry. Professor Hallsteln,
past-president of the Commission, stated that "The creation
of the SEC is a political act. Those responsible for this
EEC have never hitherto represented any view other than that
the final aim and the real. Justification of their efforts
is the intention of furthering the political unification of
Europe. . .Association pursues economic elms ."
0
Association, therefore, is an instrument of economic
progress and integration which leaves the associated State
its full political Independence beyond the obligations
actually undertaken. Association would appear to be the
logical step for those States such as the neutrals who for
political reasons find themselves unable to accept the
rigid and fundamental obligations of membership.
It has become apparent that our discussion of the
neutrals and their association with the EEC does not
include Finland. The exclusion of Finland from negotiating
with the EEC for associative status is a political reality
of that State* s relationship to the Soviet Union, resulting
in rigid neutrality. Here again, the diversities of neutrality
among the four neutrals become apparent. Whereas Finland could
pursue association with EFTA, she cannot with the EEC., Whereas
the other three States held full membership in EFTA, because of
their neutrality, they can only apply for association with the
EEC. And it will become apparent later on in our discussion
of the individual States* positions on the EEC that there are
definite differences between these three States. (A State
such as Sweden, which has no legal attachment to neutrality
is more able to consider full membership in the EEC than is
Austria or Switzerland.
)
12*1
In December of 1961
,
after negotiations between the
EEC. and Britain had begun, the three neutrals applied to
the Council of Ministers for the opening of negotiations
concerning their association. They were subsequently in-
vited. to present their views on prospective association.
Realizing that they held much in common concerning the EEC,
its aims and the obligations of neutrality, representatives
of the three States met in May, 1962, in Rattvlk, Sweden,
to discuss common requirements of neutrality and a possible
association with the EEC. At this conference, the three
nations agreed on five rules required by their common neu-
trality in regard to such association. It was decided that
they would all emphasize these requirements in their indivi-
dual hearings before the Community. These requirements are
as follows:
1. In the field of foreign trade, neutrality necessi-
tates the preservation of treaty-making powers. Neutrals
cannot delegate the sovereign right to conclude trade agree-
ments to a supra-national body. This does not prevent them
from harmonizing their national customs, but neutrality
reasons do prevent their participation In a proper customs
union which would entail the pooling of customs and foreign
trade policy.
2 . Neutrals must preserve their freedom of action In
case of war or of serious International disturbances. They
must feel secure in their right to suspend In such cases
their commitments toward the EEC to the ertent they deem
it necessary for neutrality reasons. They must be able to
decide autonomously In this respect.
3* The neutrals also feel a qualified need to reserve
their strategic Industries. They agree not to use neutrality
as a pretext to further or conceal their purely economic
Interests and thus evade the economic commitments.
^ . Neutrality is furthermore held Incompatible with
irredeemable commitments. The neutrals require the right
to give notice of dis-association in any scheme of the EEC.
5. The institutions of the EEC and the Association
treaties would, have to be clearly separated. The neutral
countries cannot accept majority decisions of the EEC which
O
would submit them to new commitments."
On July 28, 1962, Austria and Sweden presented their
cases before the EEC. Switzerland presented hers on Septem-
ber 2^, 1962. All three governments stressed that the f'1 ve
requirements of neutrality did not prevent close economic
cooperation, and that they were willing to go beyond the
obligations they had assumed under the Stockholm Treaty.
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Individually, they each presented their views on integration
and their specific hesitations regarding neutrality end
memborshi p . The Austrian Government declared:
The State Treaty and proclaimed neutrality
are thus the basis of Austria’s sovereignty
and Independence. For this reason, the
Austrian Federal Government declared in their
letter of December 12, 1961, that they would
like to enter into an economic agreement with
the European Economic Community, an agreement
which takes account of the maintenance of
Austria’s permanent neutrality and her inter-
national agreements. . .The Austrian Federal
Government takes the v 1 ew that neutrality
and the obligations under the State Treaty arc
no obstacle for Austria’s participation in the
economic integration of Europe, provided that
account is taken of the two essential pre-
conditions of Austrian foreign policy—.the
State Treaty and neutrality ... .^
In presenting the views of the Swedish government,
Minister of Commerce, M. Gunnar Dange, stressed that Sweden
believed in neither isolation nor disengagement but rather
in the efforts of solidarity. The Swedes sought within the
framework of this neutrality to associate with pracitcal
efforts of integration. He stated that:
It is thus not to the economic integration and
what it entails that Sweden’s special position
relates. The cooperation between the member
States of the European Economic Community also
contains distinctly political features. . .there
are, however, a few important features of mem-
bership which are not compatible with a policy
of neutrality. For neutrality is not only a
legal concept but Indeed also a matter of policy.
It' implies a conduct, even in peacetime which
maintains confidence in the determination as
well as the ability to remain neutral in war or
crisis. Without giving up its neutrality Sweden
could in our view not become a full member of
the Community.--^
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Finally, the Swiss views were presented by M. Wahlen,
chief of the Federal Political Department. He stated:
In the arrangements to be concluded with the
Community Switzerland will have, however, to
safeguard her independence—her federalist
structure and her system of direct democracy...
I would like to stress again, Switzerland takes
a positive interest in the endeavours made to
unite Europe. . .Switzerland is also determined
to do everything in her power, within the frame-
work of her neutrality, to contribute to the
maintenance of peace and liberty in the world ."1 -
In their statements, all three States clearly recognized the
difficulty of distinguishing between the political,
economic and legal factors underlying their attitudes. They
also seemed any 1 ous and willing to do more than sign ordinary
trade agreement. They committed themselves to the task of
making a significant contribution to the work of integration.
They also attempted, to demonstrate that they did not seek
pilvileged positions for themselves and appeared anxious to
keep to a minimum the reservations that they had concerning
association with the EEC. Yet, all sought to make clear
their continued attachment to neutrality and non-alliance.
Despite all the claims against such an interpretation,
association to a politically oriented organization such as
the EEC does place a different tint on a State’s neutrality.
Participation in an organization whose major goal is eventual
political union can only lead to accusations of partiality
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against those States claiming to he neutral. It was for
this reason that the three neutrals, hoping to stymie any
forthcoming charges of this sort, collectively laid down the
requirements of neutrality. In this way, they could Justify
their common goal of association with the EEC and avoid any
embarrassing contradictions between them. Individually,
each sought to Justify its position in respect to the rele-
vant and specific circumstances surrounding its parti lar
case. In other words, because each of the three countries
practices a different brand of neutrality ^n a different
political and economic environment, all three governments
argued for association according to its individual circum-
stance .
Austria and EEC Assoc^ ail on . The Austrian case for
association with the EEC stems from its economic, independ-
ence upon the Community and its exclusion from full member-
ship because of its neutrality. Economically, the EEC con-
stitutes Austria 1 s biggest customer in that she channels to
its members 50 per cent of her total exports.. She imports
from these countries at the rate of nearly 60 per cent if
Greece is Included in that figure. The EEC contains Austria*
s
biggest single country market, namely, the Federal Republic
of Germany. 2 6 per cent of Austria* s exports go to that
country alone. In view of these economic realities, to be
excluded from the EEC would be disastrous for the already
fragile Austrian economy. Furthermore, In light of the
economic ties between Austria and the Community, for her
to attempt a policy of autarky as a form of ” economic
Independence” Is out of the question. Similarly, the mere
maintenance of the present geographic distribution of trade
cannot assure Independence for the Austrians. This Is
especially true If we consider the Soviet interpretation
of ”a more even balance of trade,” that is, more trade
with the Soviet bloc. Such an interpretation would invari-
ably lead to economic and political subservience if Austria
should be discriminated against in important western markets.
Of the three States, Austrian neutrality would appear
to be in the most delicate position and subject to the most
immediate and serious political pressure. Austria must
maintain and consolidate the international recognition and
acceptance of her status of permanent neutrality. Moreover,
she must demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the terms and
obligations of the Constitutional Law of Neutrality are being
observed in her foreign relations. It must also be remembered
that under Article 4 (2) of the State Treaty, Austria is
forbidden from entering into any agreement which would have
the effect, directly or indirectly, 'of promoting either poli-
tical or economic union with Germany. She has in the past
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received warnings from the Soviet Union which Interprets
the Community as a "military alliance," that association
with the ESC might be construed as an unfriendly or un-
neutral act. In support of this argument, Professor
Verdross, an authority on .Austrian neutrality, concluded:
"A permanently neutral State cannot Join a multinational
economic group such as the Common Market because such an
organization alms at fusion of the national economies, and
to this end it deputes authority to a central organ to
follow a united economic policy which Is binding on the
member State.
The Government, in defending Its position, stated that
while such an attitude majr be Justified in the event that
Austria should consider full membership in the EEC, it
does not apply to consideration of an association agreement.
Austria must establish an agreement of an institutional
relationship which will operate only within an exclusive
economic sphere, and which will reserve the right to with-
draw from association status in case of war or threat of
war. The Austrian spokesmen have made it clear that they
feel in no way obligated to pursue the kind of ideological
and economic neutrality the Soviet Union appears to have in
mind. It would appear that the law of permanent neutrality,
the basic constraint placed upon Austrian policy, is In no
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way directly relevant to economic policy questions, and that
the obligation to maintain an Independence In peacetime
which will assure neutrality In the eventuality of a war
Is difficult to translate Into economic terms.
Behind these statements and arguments for association
Is a fundamental Interest in the integration of Europe.
Having already participated in a number of Integration organ-
izations (EFTA and Council of Europe), Austria has clearly
demonstrated her interest in such directions. It is now
hoped -that the practical approach which she takes towards
neutrality (pragmatic adaption to the needs of the day,
national and International) will allow her to take an active
part in EEC. That the Community represents a threat to
Austria politically and economically is undeniable. But
it also represents an opportunity to demonstrate to the
international community that neutrality does not have to
mean isolation or Ideological impartiality.
Association with the EEC does not in itself represent
a threat to Austrian neutrality. Assuredly, the Austrian
Government will not agree to any measures which violate her
Inde ience. The threat to Austrian neutrality rests
the reactions and interpretations of h^r actions in the EEC,
especially those of the Russians. For if there is any limit-
ation placed upon Austrian foreign policy other than those
conta* ned in neutrality, it is certainly those resulting
from Austria* s relationship to the Soviet Union.
Sweden and the EEC. In the case of Sweden, political
and economic considerations alone will determine her de-
cision and method of implementation concerning association
with the EEC. Unlike Austria and Switzerland, she has no
legal status of neutrality to accommodate. However, Sweden
does feel that her traditional neutralism is essential for
the maintenance of the political status quo in the Baltic
region. Thus, her preoccupation to avoid adverse Russian
reactions that itfould place Finland in jeopardy is quite
understandable
.
The record of Swedish participation in the regional
organizations and integration efforts since World War Two
illustrates that the Swedes have consistently supported the
Integration concept. Her participation in the Marshall Plan,
the OEEC and EFTA demonstrates this clearly. She was also
instrumental in trying to achieve some reconciliation between
the ’’Sir” and the ’’Seven” in 1958 -59 * However, her estrang-
ment from the EEC is understandable in light of her desire
to remain non-aligned and un-involved in political union.
The prospect of finding herself discriminated against
in her Western markets because of British membership in the
133
EEC created serious problems for Sweden economically end
politically
. In seeking association with the EEC, she hopes
to alleviate both of these problems.
Economically, it is a "must” that Sweden find some
sort of accord with the Community. Sweden is dependent
upon a large amount of foreign trade to sustain her standard
of living as well as pay for her huge defense budget. About
?0 per cent of her exports are to Western European markets,
of which 3^ cent go to the EEC countries. Scrapping
the Western European tariff barriers would consequently mean
an important advantage for Swedish exports if Sweden joins,
the market area and just' as Important a disadvantage if
she remains outside.
An examination of one of Sweden’s major industries,
paper and paper goods, illustrates very clearly the signi-
ficance of EEC association to her economy. The paper industry
in Sweden exports roughly 9 per cent of her total export.
Western Europe is the major market. Four-fifths of the paper-
exports go to this area. The breakdown within this market
is: EEC countries take b8 per cent of paper exports while
the 2FTA takes only 21 per cent. The Federal Republic of
Germany is the leading customer for these products, followed
by Britain. To include Britain in the EEC would mean that .
Sweden’s two biggest importers of a major industry would be
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discriminating against bar products. Tt also means that
the EEC would become a shortage area for paper goods, because
the major exporters of these goods, Sweden, Finland and Norway,
would remain outside the enlarged market. EFTA would become
a surplus area should it be able to continue without Britain.
What is true of the paper industries is also true of other
industries throughout the EFTA countries. Austria’s many
German-owned industries would be in the same situation as
Finland’s wood industry and Sweden’s paper industry. Some
amount of urgency was added to the Swedish Situation when
in 1962 r, -"ecess^on set in, causing many Swedish factories
and manufacturing companies to begin plans for some sort of
relationship with the EEC. This was especially true of her
distributing firms.
The debate surrounding the political consequences of
Sweden’s negotiations with the EEC ranged from those advo-
cating full membership and those in favor of association to
those arguing for strict observance of neutrality, which
would mean disengagement from the EEC altogether. Advocates
of full membership argued that Swedish neutrality was not a
legal status and, therefore, very flexible. They pointed
to the fact that the realization of the political aims of
the Rome Treaty had yet to be instituted, and that the
federalists within the ESC had lost the initiative. They
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also pointed out that the political cooperation which the
heads of government of the six States Intend to develop has,
therefore, been kept outside the Treaty and the Institutions
of the EEC. Finally, they felt that membership and association
might both tie Sweden a bit, but full membership would give
her Influence In that body.
The arguments against full membership were clearly
enumerated by Prime Minister Erlander In a speech before
the Congress of the Steel Metal Workers Union on .August 22,
1961. Excerpts from his speech Include:
....For us to be able to satisfy as far as
we possibly can our foreign policy Investment, we
need a certain degree of freedom of movement both
In practice and as laid down by formal agreements.
Freedom from alliances Is an Important and sub-
stantial part of this freedom of movement but It
must be supported by a persistent effort to avoid
any commitment even outside the sphere of military
poll cy . . .
.
On why the Rome Treaty would Jeopardize Swedish neutrality:
....There would be far-reaching consequences for
Sweden were she to accept such a trade policy; It
would mean that In this sphere It would no longer
be possible for Sweden to pursue an Independent
policy. A consequence of our joining would be
that a supranational Institution would be author-
ized to direct Swedish trade policy In a way that
was a complete departure from our commercial
policy hitherto....
On Swedish neutrality and European cooperation:
....If Sweden Is to maintain a policy of neutrality
she cannot subscribe to such a political goal for
European cooperation. I have stressed on previous
occasions that we must avoid commitments restrict-
ing our chances of enlisting confidence In our
policy of neutrality....
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....It would be extremely unfortunate if
the idea were to spread that we felt so
threatened by the economic consequences
of exclusion from European cooperation
that we were prepared to sacrifice what
for so many years has been the main line
of Swedish foreign policy ... 13
Those who debated for disengagement altogether cited
the need to maintain the statue quo in the Baltic area.
They also felt that any departure from the strict practice
of neutrality could only endanger that policy and thus
leave Sweden open to criticism and vulnerable to attack
in time of war.
The decision for association with the EEC represented
a compromise between these two extremes, plus the realities
of economic isolation. In her arguments before the Community,
the Swedish government laid stress on the limitation of her
freedom to suspend or withdraw from her obligations in time
of crisis or war and the freedom to sign agreements with
third parties in her own name. In this manner, Sweden
demonstrated the flexibility in her policy of neutrality and
her continued practice of pragmatism in foreign affairs.
,
It is evident that Sweden has a bit more leeway in
her practice o^ neutrality than does Austria. This is a.
direct result o** the absence of any leg0
'
1 commitments to
neutrality in the Swedish past. It is also a reflection of
the fact that Sweden does not operate under the direct
influence of the Soviet Union. Her neutrality and Inde-
pendence are not directly related to satisfying the interests
of the Soviets other than those concerning the Finns. In the
Swedish case, the only pressures exerted upon her neutrality
come from domestic sources as was evident in the debate over
full membership into the EEC. The fact that there was
considerable pressure in favor of full membership illustrates
that Swedish adherence to neutrality is more or less of her
own making. It also demonstrates that any major movements to
further the integration of Europe in the future might look
to the ' Swedes to set the example for neutral participation.
Swl tzcrland and the EEC. The prospect of association
with the EEC raises some important questions and dilemmas for
the Swiss in their neutrality policy. Most significant of
these concerns the rather narrow interpretation that the Swiss
have developed toward their participation in international
organizations. It is to be remembered that under the guide-
lines of their pronouncements on neutrality in 195^. the Swiss
maintain that neutrals should avoid, whenever possible, member-
ship or cooperation with intergovernmental organizations,
because it is likely to Involve the neutral in political
activities. The Swiss have stayed close to such an interpre-
tation by remaining outside the United Nations.
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However, there have been Instances where Switzerland
has abandoned such a narrow view. These hove occurred In
the movement to unify Europe, although here we do find
Inconsistencies. The Swiss participated In OEEC and EFTA
,
both pure economic organizations, with little hesitancy.
Their reluctance to join the Council of Europe, even after
the British had successfully eliminated any political de-
cision making power from It, once again Is a display of
strict observance of the 195^ guidelines.
When the Issue of association arose as a result of the
British attempt to join the EEC, the request by the Swiss
for some sort of cooperation came as a surprise to many
observers of Swiss politics. (Her subsequent membership In
the Council of Europe In 1963 added to the list of surprises.)
Because the EEC was supposedly so politically oriented, It
was expected that the Swiss would adopt the narrow inter-
pretation of neutrality. However, there wore other over-
riding circumstances and considerations to her dilemma.
The first of these considerations was her geographic
position vis-a-vis the EEC nations and the economic conse-
quences resulting from an Isolationist policy. Geographically,
Switzerland is In the middle of the EEC countries. Not only
are her major trade channels through two EEC countries, Italy
and Wdst German, but she has a growing dependence on foreign
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labor, mostly Italian. Were she to remain outside the
EEC area altogether, the clauses in the Home Treaty on
the restrictions of labor could cut into her supply. A
continued isolation by the Swiss who occupy a central
position in Europe could also lead to accusations that
her neutrality no longer served "in the interest of Europe."
The most pressure upon Switzerland would appear to
be of an economic nature. Her growing trade links with
Germany and Italy, and the fact that two-thirds of her
foreign trade is with the countries of Western Europe carry
considerable weight for association. The discrepancy be-
tween her trade figures for the EEC and EFTA are even more
revealing. While 63 per cent of her total imports come from
the EEC countries, only 12 per cent are from the EFTA .
Export figures range from 42 per cent for the EEC to only
16 per cent for the EFTA,. Of the three neutrals, the Swiss’
trade with the Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union
combined receive only 3*6 per cent of Swiss exports while
Imports from those nations barely total 2.5 per cent. As a
result, the economic considerations do deserve significant
attention in the Swiss decision.
Against this must be set her desire to adhere to the
classical status of neutralization and to avoid commit-
ments devolving from participation in certain types of
international organizations. Switzerland also felt that her
unique position in the field of mediation and good offices
might suffer in the event of association with the Community.
It is for this reason that the Swiss approach to the EEC
is a cautious one. Yet, it would seem that in order to
preserve her special status, it is necessary only for her
to conclude such terms with the Community which would allow
her to carry out the beneficial duties of a neutral in time
of war. It is rather difficult to see how her sovereign
independence or her neutrality would he threatened by a
limited participation in the efforts of the Community, given
adequate limitations in the association agreement to cover
her major preoccupation of neutrality.
There does remain one obstacle concerning economic
cooperation between the EEC and Switzerland. Because the
Swiss Federal -constitution gives important economic powers
to the cantons which the Federal Government ca.nnot of its
own volition and without complex internal procedures bargain
away, any agreement would have to take into account the
division of powers between the Confederate and Cantonal
authorities in so far as the implementation of Community
policy is concerned.
1^1
£2T.c1v °.U.* ^- s not yet clear how the problem of
the neutrals and their relation to the SEC will be solved.
The Community Itself has yet to agree on Its policy and seems
unlikely to do so until the Issues surrounding British
membership are eliminated. The two French vetoes toward
Britain’s gaining access in 1963 and again in 1966 have for
the time being delayed the break-up of the EFTA organization.
Thus, they also put off the dilemmas facing the neutrals in
the event of such an occurrence. But now that General
De Gaulle has departed from the European scene, the prospects
for British entry are again bright. .Again, the neutral
1 ssue is sure to be raised.
Meanwhile, there have been currents against the Inclusion
of neutral nations in the efforts of European integration
and in the EEC in particular. The early 1960 ’s found Under-
secretary of State for the United States, George Ball, raising
serious objections about the neutrals and their intentions.
He charged that they would hide behind their neutrality, thus
protecting themselves from any political involvement in
European affairs while reaping the economic benefits of
association with the Community. His charge found ready recip-
ients among several Community representatives, notably
Professor Hallstein and Paul-Henri Bpaak. Showing signs of
impatience with neutrality, they claimed the neutral
countries should either come or stay out.
The neutrals reacted, to such charges in typical
fashion. The Swiss were especially adamant about Secre-
tary Ball* g accusation. They felt endangered, by his
statements. In retort, they claimed that they are the
neutral, and that Europe cannot be without them. The
Austrians stated that they were only considering associa-
tion as a means of maintaining a link w*th the Western
world, and that they had no plans for isolation from their
ideological commitments to neutrality and democracy. The
Swedes felt less endangered by these charges, because', as
has been stated, theirs is a more elastic form of neutrality
and Is, therefore, in better position to cope with such
circumstances
.
There is one final point that illustrates best the
objective of this discussion. At the time or the first
British application to the EEC, the EFT/ countries signed
an agreement known as the London Declaration of June, 19 6l,
which bound them to not sign any agreements with the Community
until all of their number were assured of attaining satis-
factory arrangements. The neutrals in particular were
adamant in presenting a common front to the EEC as was
expressed by their collaboration on the requirements of
neutrality. But, after the French vetoed the British appli-
cation in 1963, It x-ras decided that each country should
negotiate individually with the Community. This was a
result of the realization on the part of those countries
that British membership did not automatically mean that they
would ride her coattails into the Community as they had
thought. -Among the neutrals, differences in the practice
of neutrality made only the broadest guidelines possible.
For .Sweden to be excluded because the Swiss take a narrow
Interpretation of neutrality and international organizations
was proven to be as absurd as if Finland should demand that
no neutral could join the EEC if she, because of her neutral-
ity, could not. Consequently, any re-opening of negotia-
tions with the EEC will be done individually, with each
country bargaining on its own basis, tantamount to its own
interests and circumstances.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This study has had several, hut limited objectives.
First, through the discussion of neutrality and Its his-
torical evolution, it was demonstrated that there had
occurred several significant changes in the concept, many
of them since the end of the First World War. The chief
responsibility for those changes lies with the establish-
ment of a collective security system, (League of Nations
and the United Nations) where neutrality was practically
outlawed; and the arrival of the cold war *n international
politics, Also illustrated by such a discussion was the
fact that there has been and remains today a discrepancy
between neutrality in coded law and in actual practice. In
other words, States which desire to practise a foreign
policy urder the guidelines of neutrality do not operate
in a political vacuum. Their attempts to adhere strictly
to the coded laws of neutrality will be thwarted by politi-
cal pressures, both internal and external, upon them. As
a result, there exist in practice many different degrees
and levels of neutrality, continually evolving and changing
relative to the shape of the international community and its
political power structure. It would seem, then, that neu-
trality means different things at different stages in time.
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Pi second objective has been to demonstrate some different
levels of neutrality by examining the Individual policies of
four European neutrals. By means of a discussion on their
relationship to International political pressures In general
and then on the specific pressures generated by the Issue of
European Integration, significant differences were found to
exist between these four States in regard to their orienta-
tion, guidelines and practice of neutrality. These differ-
ences exist despite many commonalities among them such as
Ideology, polltica -1 orientation, culture and race, and geo-
graphic pool tion. Overriding these common features are
geographic position relative to the two cold, war blocs, pre-
sence or absence of legal attachment or obligation to neutral-
ity, domestic make-up, credibility of neutrality, and commit-
ment to such a foreign policy. These forces were found to be
Instrumental in shaping the individual policies of neutrality
in the four European States.
It was also demonstrated that neutrality 1 n the cold war
actually places a nation between the two contending power
blocs. In many cases, this results In their becoming a pawn
in the struggle, subject to political pressure from the two
sides, both tugging and enticing the neutral to moderate or
abandon its perilous and insecure position for the relative
security of the power bloc. Austria and Finland are excellent
146
examples of such a situation. None of the neutrals find them-
selves In an Isolated position vis-a-vis the East-West
struggle. Indeed, the large number of articles entitled
” between East and West’ points up the neutrals*
position in international politics. (Fit in any of the four
nations.) Here again Is an Illustration that the original
definition of neutrality, meaning isolation from ideological
and political conflict no longer applies. With the evolve-
ment of the cold war and neutralism, the concept of traditional
neutrality may only exist in the event of a "hot" war. How-
ever, even this possibility 1 s threatened by the prospect of
nuclear annlhlliatlon. In such a case, there does not seem
to be any place for impartiality or isolation.
The final and most important objective has been to explain
the neutral* s position relative to European unification. We
have not attempted to answer the major question as to whether
the neutral States' roles in European integration constitute
a help or an hindrance toward the final goal of political
unification. Such a question initiates an on-going and open-
ended debate which cannot begin to be settled until there is
agreement within Europe on the character and scope of the
final solution.
Koi\rever, we might at this time take a quick look at th* s
major debate. Basically, it breaks down into two sides. On
one s1.de are those who argue that the neutrals constitute
a major hindrance to European Integration simply because
they have an overriding commitment to neutrality. In the
final solution of European unity, there can be no neutral-
ity, and that for these nations to benefit from the fruits
of what limited Integration has taken place (economic) while
showing no Indication of any sort that they intend to sac-
rifice any of their sovereignty or Independence is simply
not acceptable. They also argue that by maintaining a
commitment to neutrality, these States undermine the principles
of integration because they demonstrate a lack of faith In
the possibilities of such a goal. Finally, they also lend
support to those forces
, ,
while not neutral, which are opposed
to the concept of a united Europe.
On the other hand, the neutrals argue that those who
accuse them of a demeaning intent do not understand or com-
prehend the circumstances of neutrality. They suggest that
until agreement is reached on the final solution to integration,
one that would guarantee them security and stability, they
have a right to participate in the limited cooperation which
now exists. To deny them this would mean, in the end, to
deny them any role in a united Europe. For to expect that
the neutrals would join in the final solution of an integrated
Europe, having been denied no ties or participation previously,
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Is absurd. Not only does it take time and effort to integrate
economic and political systems, but there must be a number of
precedents established for such action. The neutrals also
maintain that they aid the integration movement by providing
places for moderation, compromise and good offices.
Although we have not attempted to deal directly with
this debate. Indirectly we have confronted it. The discussion
on the problems and dilemmas confronting the neutrals by the
integration movement focused our attention on the fact that
the neutrals have changed and moderated their stand on neu-
trality in response to the circumstances and demands made upon
them. Surely Finland challenged the MPaaslkivi line” of
appeasing the Soviet Union when she sought association with
the EFTA . Austria' also endangered her neutrality when she
asked for association with the EEC. (Since that time, the
Soviet Union has made it clear that she would not let Austria
join the EEC.) However, for the most part, these moderations
have been rather insignificant to raanj critics of the neu-
trality. Their case is bolstered by the fact that the failure
of the British to be admitted into the EEC in 1963 and 1966
has sufficiently put off any further adjustment that the neu-
trals might have to make. Until the British question is
settled, the neutrals are in a relatively secure position.
Finally, through our discussion of the neutrals and the
EFTA and EEC, It Is hoped that we may be able to see some kind
of precedent being set In the event of Erltlsh membership.
Here again, we face an open-ended question. In light of
the changes which have occurred in the last ten years regarding
European integration and the cold war, and in regard to any
special circumstances surrounding eventual British member-
ship, we have only the foundations of these States* neutrality
and their experiences of the early 1960*s to enable us to
understand their actions concerning European unity. I\ s it
is, It is far too little for any kind of authoritative pre-
diction.
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